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INTRODUCTION 
The recent introduction of the Agricultural Act of 2014 dramatically changed the 
payment mechanism for farm subsidy payments.  The bill’s commodity program is 
estimated to pay famers 32.5 billion dollars in subsidy payments (CBO, 2014).  An 
(un)stated goal of the US farm commodity program is to promote financial stability, 
hence improving growth in the farm sector.  Farm subsidy programs have become a topic 
of much debate among policy makers and economists alike.  The central issues are the 
farmers’ ability to retain subsidy dollars; the degree non-retained subsidy dollars distort 
output and factor markets; and the identification of factors contributing to the farmers’ 
non-retention of subsidy dollars. 
Empirical research has found that farm subsidies are heavily chaptalized into land 
rental rates (Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009; Kirwan, 2009; Kirwan and Roberts, 2010).  More 
recently, theoretical and experimental research have demonstrated that disparities in 
market power and negotiation behavior influence the ability of the farmer to retain 
subsidy dollars (Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, 2011; Nagler et al., 2013).  To date, 
economists have yet to develop a widely accepted economic theory pertaining to farm 
subsidy incidence.  This is primarily due to the complexities of agriculture’s multistage 
production system and various competitive relationships within and across production 
stages.  
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The method I use to analyze subsidy incidence is an innovative theoretical and 
experimental approach that partially extends the market power work of Russo, Goodhue 
and Sexton (2011).  The contribution to the subsidy incidence literature is the 
acknowledgement of a competitive environment in which  i) factors of production in 
agriculture are largely complementary, and ii) input suppliers in technically separate 
markets are able to compete for the extraction of the subsidy dollars paid to the farmer.  
The fundamental model is a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between 
a price-taking buyer and two price setting input suppliers.  The approach utilizes a game 
theoretical model to identify the impacts of (i.)  Competitive Relationships, (ii.)  Input 
Substitutability, and (iii.)  Alternative Subsidy Policies.   
i. Competitive Relationships of Input Suppliers and Competitive 
Interdependencies:  To identify the impact of market power the baseline 
market power scenario depicts a complementary monopoly setting where 
both input suppliers are the sole producer of their given products to the 
perfectly competitive downstream buyer.  The concept and a subsequent 
theoretical model, in relation to subsidy incidence, acknowledges 
upstream firms compete amidst one another (i.e. horizontal competition) 
for extraction of the marginal subsidy dollar from the farmer.  In addition, 
the model extends to include the vertical competition between one 
complementary factor producer (landowner) and the downstream buyer 
(Farmer).     
ii. Degree of Substitutability Between the Input Products:  The literature, 
with respect to agricultural subsidy incidence, to date, has ignored the 
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possibility of complementary factors of production.  Non-substitutable 
(complementary) inputs exhibit unique characteristics and generate 
spillover effects (externality) within a sector.  Specifically, in price 
competition increasing in the price of one input negatively impacts profits 
to the sellers of the complement inputs.  This cross-price effect generates a 
prisoner’s dilemma game for the two suppliers of the complementary 
inputs.  Accordingly, although to some degree counter-intuitive, both 
monopolist input suppliers would benefit by coordinating and setting 
prices below that of the Bertrand equilibriums (Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi, 
2006). 
iii. Alternative Subsidy Policies: In their history, Farm bills have introduced 
several subsidy payment mechanisms that can be placed into one of two 
general categories, decoupled or coupled.  The payment mechanisms 
influence agricultural markets in different ways.  Thus, in regards to future 
policy, we must understand to what extent these payments mechanisms 
modify the production decisions’ of farmers and pricing decisions of input 
suppliers.  Accordingly, I consider a market in the presence of no subsidy 
policy, a decoupled subsidy policy and a coupled subsidy policy.    
Specifying a market structure that simultaneously permits the input suppliers to 
display price setting, Bertrand, behavior differentiates this work from the current 
literature.  Additionally, the theory developed within this thesis is testable in a laboratory 
setting.  Testing the theory will provide validation of the extent that farmers benefit from 
subsidy payments.  In addition, experimental tests will indicate to what degree the input 
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suppliers are able to extract the subsidy dollar away from the farmer, not predicted from 
the theory. 
Consistent with past research the coupled subsidy policy results in a higher input 
price for the coupled factor, hence subsidy incidence.  As such, the farmer is unable to 
retain the entire subsidy payment because the farmers increase in welfare is less than the 
subsidy payment.  However, several new outcomes only alluded to in past research are 
observed.  First, price in the non-affiliated input market (i.e. the factor market in which 
the subsidy is not coupled) also rises.  Though the subsidy incidence applies to all inputs, 
the non-affiliated input markets capture the subsidy dollar to a lesser degree as technical 
substitution of inputs rises.  Second, aggregate subsidy incidence diminishes, as the input 
products become closer substitutes.  The combination of Bertrand competition between 
the input suppliers and the degree of substitutability between technical inputs drives these 
results. 
The details of the manuscript are as follows.  Provided first is a brief review of the 
structural changes in the agricultural sector and an overview of past and current subsidy 
policies.  This is followed by my definition of the subsidy incidence and then a review of 
the empirical, theoretical and experimental subsidy literature.  Third, I develop the 
theoretical model and discuss in detail various aspects of the model.  Fourth, I provide 
analytical solutions for a hypothetical farmer purchasing near perfect complementary 
input products, such as land and seed.  The analytical results are then directly tested in a 
laboratory experiment.  Finally, I provide results, conclusions, limitations, and 
suggestions for further research. 
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A BRIEF BACKGROUND: U.S. FARMING AND FARM POLICY 
The underlying goals of the US farm commodity programs (i.e. promoting finical 
stability through risk reduction) have not significantly changed over the last century.  
However, farm structure (i.e. the market structure and therefore the competitive relations) 
and government farm programs have undergone significant changes.  This section 
provides an overview of the structural changes in US farming and pertaining markets.  
Concluding the section is an appraisal of the US farm policy programs and overview of 
the most current state of farm policy. 
Structural Changes of the US Farming Industry  
Technological developments in agriculture have been particularly influential in 
driving changes within the farm sector and pertaining factor markets.  Technological 
advances and specialization have greatly increased efficiency in both the production and 
input markets (Kimle and Hayenga1993).  Consequently, as farmers moved towards 
buying more of their inputs (vs. producing), expenditures on inputs grew.  Figure 1, 
adapted from the farm production summary, addresses the change in spending on inputs 
over the last decade.  The two sectors of interest are seed expenditures and rent 
expenditures which increased by roughly sixty and fifty percent respectively (ERS).   
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Figure 1 Percentage Change in US Farm Input Expenditures, 1997-2007 
 
More recently, of the 200 billion dollars farmers spent producing crops is 2012, 
they spent the largest share on land rent ($25 billion) and a record high on seed products 
which totaled 17.8 billion dollars (USDA/NASS, 2013). 
Competitive relation and Market Structure  
In the model, forthcoming, I maintain the assumption of perfect knowledge as 
Alston and James (2002).  However, I relax the assumptions of a perfectly competitive 
and static market, as technological developments in the most recent decades have been 
significantly influential in altering the competitive structure of the farm sector, and 
pertaining factor markets.  I will first detail the market power and structural changes in 
the biotechnical industry and will then discuss the land rental market.    
The Agricultural Biotechnical Industry  
First, technological advances in the biotechnical engineering industry (i.e. seed 
manufacturing) have fueled rapid consolidation.  For example, six of the largest 
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multiproduct agribusiness firms, acquired sixty-eight smaller seed companies (King, 
2001).1  The consolidation leading to concentration enhances efficiency by altering 
economies to scale.  However, consolidation leads to concentration, which increases 
market power.  Specifically, consolidation increased the market power of a few firms as 
they were able to obtain a larger share of the seed manufacturing market.   
However, consolidation is not the only variation that has modified the seed sector.  
Since the commercial introduction in 1996, the market demand for GM (genetically 
modified) seeds has grown.  From 1996 to 2008 the usage in acres of GM increased from 
4.2 million to 309 million acres planted (Stiegert, Shi and Chavas, 2010).  Farmers highly 
value the GM seed’s efficiency gains through the increase in yields and reduction on 
expenditures on complementary factors of production (i.e. pesticides, herbicides, etc.).  
Thus, the GM seed industry experienced a rapid adoption rate for the positive attributes 
bred into the seed.  However, when considering the violations of perfect competition 
within the industry’s market structure, the improved seed varieties do come at a cost for 
farmers (Moschini, 2010).  
Farmers and Policy-makers scrutinize bio-tech firms–who commercialized 
patented crop seed– in regards to the firm’s monopoly power in the widely adopted 
Roundup Ready soybean and corn market.  For example, in the soybean industry, 
Monsanto’s dominance is prevalent.  Monsanto accounts for approximately 90% of the 
production acres planted, directly and indirectly (Moschini, 2010).  Moss (2009) indicates 
Monsanto’s market power, granted through US Patents, adversely affect the market 
through an increase in price and decrease in quality choices available to farmers.  Fulton 
                                                 
1 Aventis (18), AstraZeneca (7), DuPont (5), Dow Chemical (10), Monsanto (22), and Novartis (60) 
 
 8  
and Giannakas (2001) suggest the adverse effects of these patents (i.e. market power) 
have distributional impacts that are relevant for public policy consideration.     
The Agricultural Land Market  
The land market has seen an indirect impact from the technological advances that 
have increased the economies of scale in production agricultural.  As a result, farmers 
turned to seeking employment in a non-farm sector, which effectively reduced the 
number buyers in the production land market.    
The impacts of the changes are easily seen on a local level, as there might only be 
a few of perspective tenants due to the decrease in farmers (which has increased farm 
size).  The relevant region is defined as the area where famers can efficiently reach all 
land.  For instance, the famer would not want to rent land hundreds of miles from other 
parcels of land and/or residence.  The cost in this case is not just of a monetary value but 
also represents an opportunity cost with respect to efficiency.2  Raup (2003) gives 
evidence to the prior statement.  His report states that many farmers reside within a ten-
mile radius from where they rent land and Kirwan and Roberts (2010) indicate a majority 
of tenants live within a twenty-five mile radius of rented farm land (only thirteen percent 
of tenants reside over one-hundred and fifty miles away).  Additional support from 
Kiwrin and Roberts (2010), indicate a movement away from the once perfectly 
competitive environment of the land rental market.  
There are typically few buyers and few sellers in the land-rental market for a 
given geographical region.  Thus, the market structure between the landowners and 
                                                 
2 This is one of the reasons I later specify the assumption of, decreasing returns to scale. 
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famers is best described as a bilateral oligopoly.  However, for simplicity it is assumed 
the farmer (landowner) acts as monopsonist (monopolist) to model, properly, the 
decreasing competition in this dominate buyer(dominate seller) market settings.  I do 
however, recognize that even in localized markets, input suppliers may not be 
monopolist, and the farmer may not be a monopolist.  In this setting the buyer and seller 
are both setting price per unit of land based upon exogenous and endogenous factors.  It 
is important to note other factors such as personal relationships or lack thereof between 
the tenant and proprietor may alter the ability for the landowner (farmer) to act as a price-
setting firm, however, this is left as an extension (i.e. bilateral negotiations).   
In summary, because it is the case that the farmers are price takers for some inputs 
(seed) and may negotiate over the price of others (land), I assume, the upstream input 
providers are more akin to Bertrand competition.  
US Farm Policy 
The United States has supported the US farming industry with income supports 
since the 1930’s, but over time polices have substantially evolved (Gardner, 1987).  
Pressure from the World Trade Organization (WTO) has altered the US agricultural 
commodity support system to be decoupled from production (Phillips et al, 2010).  Due 
to the potential distortionary effects, the US has sought to phase out coupled payment 
mechanism subsidies and adopt a policy system which falls under a decoupled payment 
mechanism, which is excluded from punishment by the WTO (Bhaskar and Beghin, 
2009).  
In regards to future policy, it is important to understand to what extent alternative 
payment mechanisms modify the production decisions’ of farmers and input suppliers, 
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and untimely the realized profits (i.e. input and output choices).  Zhu and Lansink (2010) 
summarize four theoretical subsidy mechanisms, that induce changes in production: (i) 
change in relative prices of inputs and outputs,;  (ii) an income effect; (iii) the risk factor, 
including perception and preferences; and (vi) through economies of scale (i.e. entry and 
exit decisions in the farm production sector).  The variation across the coupled and 
decoupled programs will link farmers’ and input supplier behavior along with the market 
outcomes.  Thus, the variation will allow for inferences to benefits and effectiveness 
specific payment mechanisms. 
With the recent introduction Agricultural Act of 2014, the economic subsidy 
incidence of various programs is a matter of high importance.  Title I of the farm bill 
relates to commodity support programs.  The new farm bill, passed in February of 2014, 
eliminates Direct Payments, Countercyclical Payments, and the Average Crop Revenue 
Election (ACRE) program.  Two new programs the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and 
Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) replace these previous programs (USDA/ERS, 2014).  
Furthermore, the Agricultural Act or 2014 allocated two times the about to insurance 
programs as it does to the traditional commodity programs; As the focus of governmental 
agricultural support shifts toward crop insurance (Just and Kropp, 2009).  Accordingly, it 
must be determined if removing the decoupled payment (fixed payments) system was in 
the best interest of the agriculture sector or if the new coupled payments will be more 
efficient.  In other words, what payment mechanism distorts production the least while 
improving the farmer’s welfare the greatest, thus which has a relative advantage.  
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Decoupled Policies  
The first decoupled program, production flexibility contracts, based upon 
“historic acreage and yields” was introduced in the 1996 Farm Bill (Kropp and Peckham, 
2012).  As defined by Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) decoupled payments are “financed by 
taxpayers and are not tied to current production, factor use or prices, for which eligibility 
criteria are defined by a fixed historical base period,” and therefore cause little to no 
market distortion .  Such decoupled payments fall in the WTO’s ‘green box’ (no 
distortions and not production limiting) and along with the ‘blue box’ (some distortions 
but production limiting, i.e. quota) are excluded from discipline by the WTO (Bhaskar 
and Beghin, 2009).   
Though fixed subsidies are theoretically independent of the farmer’s output 
decisions, the experimental literature suggests payments of this form may not be as 
decoupled as assumed by theory due to human behavior (Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009).  
The literature indicate that decoupled payment mechanisms can enter a farmers 
production function through risk (perception and/or preferences), and expectations 
(Bhaskar and Beghin , 2009; O’Donoghue and Whitaker, 2010 Just and Kropp, 2009; 
Guatella et al., 2013).  However, to what degree these decoupled payments affect 
commodity production is not clear; therefore, Weber and Key (2011) phrase subsidy 
distribution as an open question.   
Coupled Policies 
When a direct linage exists between a farmer’s production process and (or) 
market conditions, the farm program is categorized as coupled.  Thus, coupled subsides 
can benefit the farmer by reducing per unit cost (input specific subsidies) or increase per 
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unit profits (output specific subsidies).  The literature suggests coupled programs as 
having a greater distortionary effect on agriculture production, and pertaining upstream 
and downstream agricultural markets.  As the coupled subsidies are able to distort the 
market by reallocating a farmers focus to a specific crop, or a mix of crops.  
The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program was a product of the 2008 
Farm Bill.  This was a major change in US farm policy, as this program differed from the 
coupled price triggered payments of the past.  Payments with respect to the ACRE 
program are triggered when at the state and farm level a revenue loss occurs (Dismukes, 
Arriola, and Coble, 2010).  ACRE payments where based on the difference between the 
state target and actual state revenue.  Thus, coupled to price and yields, on a state and 
farm level (Kropp and Peckham 2012).3   
The Agricultural Act of 2014 introduces two programs that follow a similar 
payment mechanism to the ACRE program of the 2008 Farm Bill; however, the programs 
have minor changes.  The first program, Price Loss Coverage (PLC) is triggered by target 
prices per commodity, and the second program, Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) is 
based on a moving average of revenue risk.  If elected, the PLC, makes payments when 
triggered by prices below the outlined reference price to producers with base acres on a 
commodity-by-commodity basis.4  The ARC Program gives producers two-coverage 
options county-based or individual coverage.  Payments are made to producers (with base 
                                                 
3 The assumption of a competitive output market of homogenous commodities—therefore a market price—
is made.   
4 “The payment rate is the difference between the reference price and the annual national-average market 
price (or marketing assistance loan rate, if higher). For each covered commodity enrolled on the farm, the 
payment amount is the payment rate, times 85 percent of base acres of the commodity, times payment 
yield. Producers may also receive payments on former cotton base acres (termed “generic base acres”) that 
are planted to a covered commodity.” (USDA/ERS, 2014) 
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acreage) on a commodity-by-commodity basis when county crop revenue (calculated by 
actual average county yield & national commodity price) falls below eighty six percent of 
the county benchmark revenue (based on a 5-year Olympic average).5  Alternatively, 
producers can use individual farm revenue instead of county revenue.  In this case, 
payments triggered when individual aggregate crop revenues (i.e. all ARC program crops 
on farm), are less than the ARC individual guarantee.6 
 
                                                 
5 “For each covered commodity enrolled on the farm, the county ARC payment amount is the difference 
between the per-acre guarantee (as calculated above) and actual per-acre revenue (but no greater than 10 
percent of the commodity’s benchmark revenue), times 85 percent of base acres of the commodity.” 
(USDA/ERS, 2014) 
6 “Payment is 86 percent of the farm’s individual benchmark guarantee, defined as the sum across all 
covered commodities, weighted by plantings, of each commodity’s average revenue—the ARC guarantee 
price (the 5-year Olympic average of national price or the reference price—whichever is higher for each 
year) times the 5-year Olympic average individual yield. The payment amount is the individual farm 
payment rate (the difference between the individual farm guarantee and actual individual farm revenue, but 
no greater than 10 percent of the farm’s benchmark revenue) times 65 percent of base acres for all covered 
commodities for the individual farm.” (USDA/ERS, 2014) 
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LITERATURE: PREVIOUS ECONOMIC INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE 
INCIDENCE OF US FARM POLICY 
Theoretical work pertaining to the farm program payments date back to Floyd 
(1965).  Floyd’s neoclassical theory is grounded in the use of price elasticities.  It is 
hypothesized, that land being the most inelastic factor of production, will capitalize most 
if not all of the marginal subsidy dollar, based upon the laws of supply and demand.  
However, the prediction works if and only if all input markets are perfectly competitive.  
A perfectly competitive market must be comprised of many price taking buyers and 
sellers of homogenous products.  It should be noted neither the land rental market nor 
commodity seed market conform to the prior speciation (See Chapter II).  Thus, Kirwan 
(2009) views previous works that assume full incidence to land owners as flawed based 
upon the realities of imperfect competition and social norms.  
Currently, focus is moving towards relaxing the assumption of perfect 
competition.  Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2008) spawned the discussion of market power 
in the context of agricultural subsidies in regards to ethanol and the corn sector.  Russo, 
Goodhue and Sexton, (2011) also demonstrate that fallacies exist in the assumption of 
perfect competition.  Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, (2011) demonstrate by means of 
simulations that the distribution of the marginal dollar intended for famers is highly 
dependent upon the relational market power between the farmer’s upstream and 
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downstream markets.  Most recently, Nagler et al. (2013) demonstrate by means of 
laboratory experiments that the retention of subsidy dollars (or lack thereof) is highly 
dependent upon negotiation behavior and to some extent the competition between 
hypothetical farmers and landowners. 
The section is organized as follows.  First, I discuss how I define and measure the 
subsidy incidence.  Then I will review the current state if the literature with in regards to 
the theoretical and empirical methods.  I will then move on to an appraisal of the 
experimental methods. 
Defining and Measuring Subsidy Incidence 
Economic incidence, as referred by Kirwan (2007), is a more interesting matter 
[then statutory incidence] as economic incidence is the examination and analysis of 
behavioral changes, rather than legal rights.  In the context of farm subsidies, the 
economic incidence, examines to what degree the intended beneficiary (the farmer) 
captures the marginal subsidy dollar or to what extent the upstream (and downstream, 
although that is beyond the scope of this study) firms in the factor market extract the 
subsidy dollar.  Otherwise stated, for every dollar the farmer receives from a subsidy 
payment, how much are the input suppliers simultaneously able to extract through higher 
prices when they exert market power.  The distribution and extent to which farmers, the 
intended beneficiaries, actually benefit is critical to understanding the effectiveness of 
subsidy policy.  First, as one of Harberger’s (1971) three postulates, the benefits and cost 
for the participants within this market will be added without regard to whom they occur, 
across policy treatments for the ‘sector’ welfare (Efficiency) analysis (Alston and James, 
2002).  Secondly, the cost and benefits for participants within the market with regard to 
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whom they occur will be addressed to analyze the ‘sector’ equality.  In other words, I will 
evaluate the welfare implications and production distortion of various payments 
mechanisms to determine which has a relative advantage. 
Review Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
The subsidy incidence with respect to only one factor of production, land markets, 
is overwhelmingly prevalent in both the theoretical and empirical work (Roberts and 
Kirwan, 2003; Hendricks, Janzen, and Dhuyvetter, 2013; Kirwan, 2009;  Latruffe, and  
Mouël, 2009; Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, 2008.  Kirwan (2007) points out the basis of 
these simplistic models, which only use the rental market, is due to the fact that farmland 
rental markets is unique.  Where Kirwan defines unique as “provide an ideal setting to 
measure the economic incidence of agricultural subsidies” due to the per period price 
which allows the expectation about future periods to be dismissed.  However, many 
agriculture inputs display a high degree of complementarity and at the extreme is land 
and seed.  The literature in the current state has not examined the effect of this 
relationship in regards to impacts on the distribution of the subsidy dollar.  Therefore, the 
findings of Singh and Vives (1984) become a fundamental part of my modeling approach 
which specifies the dominant strategy for symmetric quality duopoly is to choose price 
when complement input goods are considered. 
The early literature is built upon the net present value model (NPV) or variations, 
to estimate the subsidy incidence on land values,  resulting in estimates being close to 
perfect incidence, i.e. the subsidy is being capitalized fully by the land value or rent 
(Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992; Just and Miranowski, 1993; Weersink et al, 1999; 
Schmitz, Just, and Moss 2003).  Even as recent as 2011 the NPV model was used to 
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conclude that subsidies are capitalized into land values, thus land owners are the main 
beneficiaries of the farm program (Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné, 2011).  
However, the fundamental empirical model (NPV model) results in many unanswered 
questions.  Hendricks, Janzen, and Dhuyvetter. (2012) suggests challenges to this method 
of estimating the incidence of land values based on the data to estimate all parameters in 
the NPV model is not available.  Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné (2003) also 
conclude that not all relevant data for the NPV is available.  In addition, the way in which 
the subsidy enters into objective function in the NPV model raises question about the 
models construct validity (i.e. ability to identify, accurately or consistently, the subsidy 
incidence), and consequently ability to establish a causal relationship (Kirwan, 2007)   
Kirwan ( 2007, 2009) has contradicted (most) of the early literature with findings 
suggesting that landowners only capture twenty to twenty- five percent of the marginal 
subsidy dollar.  As the literature currently stands, it is clear that a large part of the 
marginal subsidy dollar has yet to be accounted for.  This raises an important question, if 
the landowner captures only twenty to twenty-five cents of every additional dollar, whom 
is able to capture the remaining eighty to seventy-five cents of the subsidy dollar?  
Kirwan (2007) suggests that when input prices rise considerably with respect to a 
subsidy, input suppliers are able to extract the benefits.  Although market power is not 
detailed or explicitly accounted for, the suggested rent-seeking activity can be done if and 
only if a firm has some kinds of power in the market (Kirwan, 2007).   
Kirwan’s collaboration with Roberts (2010) utilize the rental rate model and finds 
that subsidies are not “fully capitated into land values” with evidence close the Kirwan’s 
(2007) prior work.  The suggested reason is tenants have bargaining power due to social 
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norms—family ties or relationship between tenant (Farmer) and Landowner (Kirwan and 
Roberts, 2010).  Hendricks, Janzen, and Dhuyvetter (2012), adds another element and 
suggests the period of the contract could alter the rate of incidence.     
More recently, some focus has been moving towards relaxing the assumption of 
perfect competition.  Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2008) laid the foundation of market 
power in the context of ethanol subsidies.  The analytical model raised the question of 
market power — and states presence will alter the subsidy distribution.  Specifically, the 
research is focused on “whether analyses that rely upon this assumption [competitive 
environment] are able to capture the true distribution of benefits from ethanol subsidies 
on presence [of downstream and/or upstream market power]”.  However, an oversight 
was the lack of generality of the model as the Leontief function is rather restrictive thus 
results in a loss of explanatory power.  In all though, their results suggest larger 
distributional impact when market power is considered.  Furthermore, market power’s 
distributional impact on subsidy incidence is larger than price and quantity impacts alone.  
Thus, the welfare impactions with respect to equity (i.e. benefiting those intended) maybe 
lower than once expected.  As Saitone and her co-authors question the validity of 
previous works that assume a perfectly competitive market in the downstream, I question 
the validity in the upstream market.  Therefore, I will extend this concept to the upstream 
market and account for the horizontal competition rather than vertical competition in the 
above manuscript.   
Russo, Goodhue and Sexton (2011) also conclude that market power can 
redistribute the marginal dollar of the farm policy.  Thus, Russo, Goodhue and Sexton 
(2011) also demonstrate that fallacies exist in the commonly made assumption of perfect 
 
 19  
competition.  Fallacies exist because in the presence of market power, the policy 
outcomes are suggested to differ greatly from the intended results (Russo, Goodhue and 
Sexton, 2011).  However, the three stage production model considered one upstream and 
one downstream market, and ignored the horizontal competition that exist in the upstream 
market.  
Neither empirical nor theoretical approaches thus far have been able to form 
robust estimates for the subsidy incidence.  Consequently, the literature has no clear or 
well defined measure of the subsidy incidence, as the marginal subsidy dollar low (high) 
bound for the incidence is twenty-one cents (one dollar) (Kirwan, 2009 and Floyd, 1965).  
However, I can make one clear conclusion; analytical, econometrics, empirical, and 
theoretical methods, leave many questions unanswered.  The underlying discrepancies of 
the estimates, as appraised by Myers, Sexton and Tomek (2010) indicate that the perfect 
competition assumption may be at cause, as the assumption will lead to misleading 
results when an oligopoly, oligopsony or both characterize the true institution.   
Experimental Literature 
Since, economic incidence is concerned with behavior and factors that alter 
behavior the insights provided, from the empirical and theoretical approaches that 
comprise the majority of the subsidy incidence literature are not the most intuitive 
approach.  Experimental economics is a way to explore human behavior in an economic 
decision setting by allowing the researcher to tightly control the environment in which 
the participants make decisions (Riedl, 2009).  Thus, experimental economics is a more 
appropriate to obtain intuition to a policy matter, than its counterpart empirical analysis, 
due to the multistage production problem that is concerned with changes in behavior.  
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The laboratory setting will allow isolation of theory’s explanatory power and therefore 
allow causation inferences to be made which is vital in solving “complex production and 
allocation problems” (Davis and Holt, 1993). 
The growing literature applying experimental economics to the economic 
incidence of farm subsidies provide a means to measure the economic incidence form the 
theory model in a laboratory setting.  Bastian et al (2008) conducted an ex ante evaluation 
of agricultural policy using an experimental approach.  The findings suggest when 
evaluating a current policy the available data is not robust enough for an accurate 
indication of the incidence.  Accordingly, I utilize an experimental approach to address 
the problem of the economic farm subsidy incidence.  Philips et al (2010) find that a 
decoupled policy mechanism more efficiently reaches the intended policy objective, 
mainly because the mechanism induces fewer market-altering distortions.  The payments 
system for this experiment are out of date with current policy, as the decoupled scheme of 
fixed lump sum payments were eliminated in the Agricultural Act of 2014.  However, a 
fixed payment mechanism does allow for insightful comparisons across alternative policy 
treatments. 
The most recent experimental work on subsidy incidence focuses on the transfer 
efficiency and market distortions when payments to farmers are transferred to the input 
market.  The results roughly 50-50 split contradicts the more recent empirical estimates, 
however, Nagler et al. (2013) observe subsidy incidence in in the presence of 
negotiations, which may be the reason for the difference.  However, this is a more 
efficient way to conduct policy analysis, as ex ante allows for the decomposition and 
analysis of policies before implementation.      
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I will appeal to the strengths of the current literature while accounting for the 
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THEORETICAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
I develop a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game, where two upstream 
firms are Bertrand competitors selling complementary goods (i.e. factors of production).  
Where, a hypothetical seed manufacture competes with a landowner in setting prices.  I 
assume that price is the focal point of the quantity input decisions of the farmer.  I 
recognize that even in localized markets, input suppliers may not be monopolists, and the 
farmer may not be monopsonist.  However, the model does provide important qualitative 
insights into subsidy incidence and testable hypotheses for laboratory experiments.  The 
model can be easily extended to include bilateral negotiations, by allowing negotiation, 
the typical trading institution for land rent. This would allow the farmer to gain some 
measure of countervailing market power.7  
i. I will continue with modeling the corner solutions for a bilateral 
monopoly, which occurs when a monopolist faces a monopsonist.  The 
three possible outcomes of the market in Bertrand competition are: The 
buyer (monopsony) or seller (monopoly) can act as a dominate player and 
force the other to accept the price decision. 
                                                 
7 See Chapter VII  
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ii. The participants can cooperate, thus achieving a joint solution. 
iii.  The market could collapse in which case the landowner would not sell 
land and the farmer would purchase no land, in other words stage 2 would 
not occur.   
Accordingly, obtaining the solutions for a dominate seller (landowner) and a dominate 
buyer (farmer) will provide useful baselines in regards to analyzing the market outcomes, 
with respect to price boundaries.   
The theoretical model presents six Nash predictions (i.e. subgame perfect Nash 
equilibriums).  More specifically, this thesis investigates two market power scenarios for 
three alternative subsidy policies.  The market power scenarios investigated are 
i. Dominate Seller (DS):   Monopolist Seed Manufacturer and Landowner 
vs. a Competitive Farmer  
ii. Dominate Buyer (DB): Monopolist Seed Manufacturer and Competitive 
Landowner vs. a Monopsonist Farmer  
The model permits the input suppliers (and buyer) to simultaneously exert market power 
and thus compete for the subsidy dollar in the following subsidy policies 
i. No Subsidy (NS)  
ii. Fixed Subsidy (FS):  Independent of farmer production and/or input 
supplier pricing decisions,  
iii. Coupled Subsidy (CS): Tied to the amount Land the farmer choices to put 
into production given the prices of inputs. 
The approach allows for the corner solutions of the bilateral monopoly to be 
analyzed in regards to prices, sector welfare and surplus distributions.  Finally, the 
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theoretical predictions will be tested in three experimental treatments, by means of 
laboratory experiments. 
Farmer Technology 
To begin I stipulate the production technology of the farmer, as it is pivotal in the 
derivation of the differentiated factor demands faced by the input suppliers. As discussed 
by Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2008), whom employ a Leontief production function, a 
relatively inelastic demand exists between land and seed.  However, the functional form 
fails to provide negatively sloped differentiated factor demands— a requirement for input 
suppliers to exert market power.  Therefore, the choice of production technology (i.e. the 
functional form) for agricultural inputs must be flexible enough while still allowing for 
near fixed proportion technology. 
Initially considered was the fully flexible and the well-known CES production 
function.  However, I am able to demonstrate there exist limitations of this functional 
form in the presence of Bertrand market power.  Primarily, regardless of product 
differentiation, Bertrand competition results in input suppliers employing marginal cost 
pricing (See Appendix A).   Alternatively, I utilize a quadratic production technology that 
follows from the well-known quadratic utility function derived by Bowley, (1924).   
The Bowley model has been used extensively in modeling differentiated product 
in Bertrand and Cournot competition (e.g. Dixit, 1979: Singh and Vives, 1984; Häckner 
2000; Symeonidis, 2002).  By rephrasing the parameters of the Bowley model, the 
farmer’s (F) technology can be written as 
 2 21( ) ( 2 )
2
Y a L S b L LS S m      ,
 (1) 
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where land (L) and seed (S) are the two representative inputs used by the famer to 
produce output of commodity (Y).  The intercept for the aggregate demand of inputs, a, 
and the slope of the aggregate demand, b, are positive parameters; σ represents the degree 
of substitutability between the two inputs, , where a value of -1 denotes perfect technical 
complements, 0 technical independence, and 1 perfect technical substitutes.  Finally, m 
represents all other inputs with price normalized to 1. 
Though the modeling approach in applicable to all degrees of technical input 
substitutability, we focus only on technical complements as most farm inputs are 
complementary in nature such as seed, land, fertilizer, and equipment.  Because only 
complement input goods are considered, I rely on the findings of Singh and Vives (1984) 
and others that the dominant strategy for symmetric quality duopoly is to choose price 
when products are complements. 
Dominate Seller (DS): Monopolist Seed Manufacturer and Landowner and the 
Competitive Farmer 
The industry structure and competitive relationship assumptions are as follows.  
To begin, the representative farmer acts as a profit maximizer.8  I begin the solution 
process in stage two from which the input suppliers begin their backward induction.  In 
stage two, the general form of the farmer’s (F) objective function is  
  ( , ) ( , )FMax PY L S C L S   , (2) 
                                                 
8 The profit maximization assumption implies that the farmer is risk neutral.  Thus, the farmer whom faces 
risk in the context of this model through the market price of commodity Y, chooses only to be concerned 
with profit and therefore maximizes the expected value of his profit with respect to input choices.  
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where I assume the farmer takes output price P and input costs C as given and  Y(L,S) is 
the production technology of the farmer.  In stage two, the buyer (farmer) chooses 
quantity subject to the prices set by the input suppliers.  In stage one, the suppliers 
simultaneously and independently choose a price while accounting for horizontal 
competition and by backwards induction the farmer’s production technology and the 
complementarity the inputs.  The diagram depicted in Figure 2 illustrates the industry 
structure and competitive relationships between the players used to develop the 
theoretical model. 
 
Figure 2 The Relation and Market Interactions of the Farmer, Landowner and Seed 
Manufacture 
 
The section begins with derivation of the baseline scenario, a market with no 
subsidy policy.  The no subsidy case is followed by a fixed lump sum payment 
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mechanism then finally the coupled subsidy mechanism.  After all theoretical solutions 
are derived the surplus distributions of all three policy cases will be discussed 
No Subsidy Policy (NS) 
I first derive the results when there is no subsidy policy in place and this 
represents the baseline of comparison to other subsidy policies.  Substituting the 
technology equation (1) into the farmer’s general profit equation results in the famer’s 
explicit objective function 
 2 2
,




Max P a L S b L LS S w L w S         
 
, (3) 
where Lw  and Sw  represent the price of land (rental rate) and seed, respectively.  Taking 
the first order conditions of profit equation (3) results in 
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Taking the second order conditions of profit equation (3) results in 
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Thus, confirming that the (Bowley type) technology allows for satisfaction of both the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for profit maximization. 
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Simultaneous solution of the first order conditions results in the following factor 
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Because the farmer is a price taker in the input market, the factor demands constitute the 
farmer’s second stage best response functions to input prices 
To address the appropriateness of assuming a quadratic technology I will describe 
attributes of the Bowley type factor demands.  I use the comparative statics with regard to 
the factor demands of land and seed.  First, I look at the factor demands with respect to a 
change in output price and find 
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Thus, increasing output price of a program commodity increases the quantity of land and 
seed the farmer is willing to purchase.  Taking the own input price comparative static 
results in 
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Therefore, the factor demands are downward sloping which facilitates input provider 
market power.  Taking the cross price comparative static I find that 
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Therefore, because of the negative cross price relationship, attempts of input rivals to 
increase price reduces both firms output.  In all, the Bowley technology results in 
appropriate attributes of factor demand. 
With the famer’s second stage best responses (factor demands), I turn my 
attention to the competition between the input suppliers in stage one.  The seed firm and 
landowner simultaneously set price while accounting for the farmer’s substitutability of 
their respective products.  Without loss of generality, I let the representative input 
suppliers have symmetric constant marginal cost equal to zero, no fixed cost, and no 
capacity constraints (Dixit, 1979).  By backward induction, the landowner (L) and seed 
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After substitution of the respective factor demand equations (7), the first order 
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Solving the first order conditions with respect to own price, results in the 
landowner’s and seed firm’s Bertrand reaction functions  
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. (14) 
It is easily shown (Figure 3) that the reaction functions are downward sloping for 
technical complements. 
 
Figure 3 The Bertrand Reaction Functions of the Seed Manufacture and Landowner 
in Terms of ( )l Sw w  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and σ=-0.99 
Simultaneous solution of reaction functions (14) result in the Bertrand subgame 
perfect no-subsidy equilibrium (NSE) prices for land (rental rate) and seed,  
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Therefore, suppliers optimally exert market power and choose prices above their 









  for 
all conventional restrictions of parameter values.  Therefore, the degree of market power 
is a function of substitutability.  As can be seen in figure 4, as inputs become closer 
technical complements, equilibrium prices reach their highest levels above marginal 
costs. 
 
Figure 4 No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Input Prices  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1 
Given the equilibrium prices from stage one; I now return to stage two, the 
farmer’s equilibrium choices of input quantities and resulting profit.  By substitution of 
the equilibrium input price equations (15) into factor demand equations (7) results in the 
equilibrium quantities of land and seed,  
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It is important to note that the relationship between input substitutability and 
optimal inputs purchased is strictly convex as 
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Figure 5 demonstrates this convex relationship over the range of input complementarity. 
 
Figure 5 No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Quantities 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1 
Therefore, as technical complementarity increases, the optimal input quantities 
increase.  Furthermore, by extension it is necessary that the commodity output increases 
per the farmer’s technology (1).  Interestingly, by comparing Figures 4 and 5, it is readily 
apparent that increasing technical complementarity increases both market power and 
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production.   The output result is not intuitively obvious as increasing market power 
typically results in lower outputs, and hence reduced surplus to the buyer.  
Next, I will examine the impacts of technical input complementarity on the 
profitability of farmer, and then input suppliers.  Starting with the Farmer, by substitution 
of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (15) and quantities (16) 
into the farmer’s profit function (3) I find  
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The farmer’s equilibrium profit is strictly convex as  
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Next, looking at upstream input suppliers, by substitution of the corresponding 
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (15) and quantities (16) into the 
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It is the case that supplier profits are strictly decreasing in the substitutability of their 
input as  
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As can be seen in figure 6, for various degrees of input complementarity, the 
highest profit for all three firms is when input products are nearly perfect complements. 
 
Figure 6 No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Profits of Farmer and Input Suppliers  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1 
By comparing figures 4 and 6, increasing market power as indicated by higher 
input prices results in higher, not lower, buyer profits.  The reason for this apparently 
counter intuitive result is due to the expansionary effects in input/output depicted in 
figure 5 as input complementarity increases.  Therefore, buyer surplus increases when 
inputs are close complements.  In all, increasing the complementarity between technical 
inputs i) increases market power and ii) unilaterally increases sector surplus.  Again, the 
                                                 
9 Following classical results, profit for Bertrand competitors approach zero as substitutability approaches 1 
(i.e. perfect complements)  
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later results are largely due to the expansionary effects of input complementarity.  
Therefore, an increase in market power of input suppliers does not necessarily harm 
sector welfare. 
Fixed Subsidy Policy (FS) 
The first subsidy analyzed is a decoupled or fixed subsidy.  As defined by 
Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) decoupled payments are “not tied to current production, 
and/or factor use or prices,” therefore causing little market distortion.  As O’Donoghue 
and Whitaker (2010) we focus on whether or not the direct payments induce a change in 
the farm’s production decision.  Accordingly, define the objective function of the farmer 
eligible for a generic fixed subsidy G 
 2 2
,
1 ( ) ( 2 )
2
FS
F L SL S
Max P a L S b L LS S G w L w S          
 
. (22) 
Given the assumed separable influence of G,  subsequent subgame perfect 
solutions of the dynamic game outlined in the previous section will equal those observed 
under the no-subsidy policy (Just and Kropp, 2009; Guastella et al, 2013; Nagler et al, 
2013).  By substitution of the subgame perfect input prices (15) and quantities (16) into 
the farmer’s profit (22), the farmer’s new equilibrium profit is  
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The direct effect of decoupled payments cannot be rebutted, as the fixed subsidy 
improves the farmer’s sector surplus and does not distort input market prices and 
quantities under the assumption that G  is a separable influence on the farmer’s 
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investment decision.  In other words, theoretically it is clear separable payments raise the 
profit and welfare of farmers’.  However, decoupled payments may have indirect effects 
on agricultural production and markets. 
Coupled Subsidy Policy (CS) 
Coupled subsidies enter the farmer’s objective function as essentially an input 
price support of land.  The subsidy is ‘coupled’ in the sense that the payment mechanism 
effectively reduces the price (rental rate) per acre of land, thus decreasing the marginal 
factor cost of land to the farmer.  The payment mechanism is a proxy for base acreage 
payments determined by historic acreage and yield (Kropp and Peckham, 2012).  The 
size of the base acreage payment is associated with the amount of land the farmer places 
under production.10  In addition, whoever farms the land receives the payment.  The 
model that follows does not rely on assumptions of whether the farmer purchases land or 
pays cash rent. 
As with the no-subsidy policy, we begin our analysis at stage two of the game.  
The farmer’s objective function is now 
 2 2
,
1( ) ( 2 ) ( )
2
CS
F L SL S
Max P a L S b L LS S w L w S           
 
, (24) 
where   is the subsidy payment per acre of land.11   
                                                 
10 Following from Just and Kropp (2009) I assume, for simplicity in modeling, that all acres provided by 
landowner and under consideration by farmer are allocated to base acreage.  In other words only L 
represents only base acreage, thus only base acreage can be put into production in this model.    
11 I do not explicitly ignore the impact on the competitive output price ( )P   that would arise systematically 
from the ultimate reduction in consumer demand stemming from the redistribution of wealth from the 
required tax.  An interesting extension would be to explicitly identify the derived demand the facing the 
farmer, include the social planner as an active player, and solve for the optimal subsidy. 
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By taking the first order conditions of profit equation (24) and simultaneously 
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 (25) 
Notice with the addition of the coupled subsidy that the factor demands are no 
longer symmetric as was the case with no-subsidy policy.  This result is due to the 
coupling of the subsidy to only one input market (in this case land).  To confirm the 
impact of the coupled subsidy on the factor demands, I take the comparative static of the 
factor demand for land and seed (25) with respect to the size of the subsidy, the results 
are  
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 , (26) 
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    

   (27) 
Therefore, increasing the subsidy increases the demand for both inputs.  However, 
the increase in factor demand for the non-affiliated complement input (S) is less than that 
for the affiliated complement input (L).  Note, these results will be important when 
discussing the impacts on profitability between the two input suppliers.   
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With the farmer’s optimal reaction to prices and a coupled subsidy from stage 
two, I return too stage one and the supplier competition.  Assuming that the subsidy 
program is common knowledge, the input providers take into account the 
complementarity of the inputs and the payment mechanism into account as they seek to 
maximize profit.  By substituting the corresponding factor demands (25) into the 




1 ( (1 ) )
2













   





Figure 7 The Bertrand Reaction Functions of the Seed Manufacture and Landowner 
in Terms of ( )l Sw w in the Presence of an Input Subsidy on the Rental Rate 
of Land  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and   = -1 
 
 39  
Notice in the above figure (7) that the landowner and seed firm’s reaction 
functions are positively impacted from higher subsidies regardless of the technical 
substitutability between the competitors output.  As such, the coupled subsidy necessarily 
raises equilibrium prices.  
Simultaneous solution of reaction functions (28) results in subgame perfect 
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 (29) 
It is the case that 0  ( , , ) 0 and -1 0CSE CSEL Sw w a P        .  Therefore, the coupled 
subsidy conveys a strategic pricing advantage to the affiliated firm (L).  
Next, by taking the comparative static of (29) in relation to the subsidy, it is 































are positive when inputs are technical complements.  Therefore, both equilibrium input 
prices rise relative to an increase in the subsidy, but more so in the affiliated market (L).  
As can be seen in figure 8, in relation to the no and fixed subsidy policies the price for 
land (affiliated input) and seed (non-affiliated input) are higher for all degrees of 
technical complementarity under a coupled subsidy policy.   
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Figure 8 Coupled subsidy Equilibrium Prices vs. NS and FS   
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and 1   
I address, next, the input quantity decision by the farmer in the second stage.  By 
substitution of the corresponding input providers’ subgame perfect equilibrium prices 
(29) into the farmer factor demands (25) results in the asymmetric subgame perfect 






( 2) ( 2)  
( 5 4)























Taking the comparative static of (31) in relation to the coupled subsidy payment, 
it is observable under conventional parameters that  
 


























   .
  (32) 
Additionally, it is true that 0  ( , , ) 0 and -1 0
CSE CSE
F FL S a P        .  
Therefore, the coupled subsidy also conveys a strategic output advantage to the affiliated 
firm (L).  As perceived in figure 9, the equilibrium quantity of land (affiliated input) and 
seed (non-affiliated input) is greater for all degrees of technical complementarity under a 
coupled subsidy policy in relation to a no and fixed subsidy policies. 
 
Figure 9 Coupled Subsidy policy Equilibrium Factor Quantities 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and 1   
In relation to sector profits, by substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect 
equilibrium prices (29) and quantities (31) into the profit function (24) results in the 
farmer’s equilibrium profit 
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By taking the comparative static of the farmer’s profit (33) in relation to the 
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for conventional parameters.  It can also be shown that the famer’s profit is strictly 
convex for appropriate restrictions on the parameters and reaches a minimum at 0  . 
By substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium prices (29) and 
quantities (31) into the landowner and seed firm profit functions (11) results in the 
suppliers equilibrium profits 
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By taking the comparative static of the farmer’s profit (35) in relation to the 
coupled subsidy, it is observable that  
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for conventional parameters.  
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Figure 4.9 summarizes the profits of the farmer (33), landowner and seed firm 
(35).  As can be seen, the farmer’s profit is strictly less than either input suppliers for 
relatively close technical complement inputs.  However, as inputs become close 
substitutes, the farm’s profit improves relative to both suppliers, for most values of the 
subsidy.  As expected from the result of optimal pricing, the supplier in the non-affiliated 
market (S) suffers a competitive disadvantage in profitability relative to the affiliated firm 
(L). 
 
Figure 10 Coupled Subsidy Equilibrium Profits of Farmer, Landowner and Seed Firm  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and 1   
Summary of Sector Welfare Distribution Per Subsidy Policy 
Next, to gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the no-subsidy policy, 
fixed and coupled subsidy, I analyze the distribution of the total sector surplus in relation 
to product substitutability calculated as 
 
 44  







No Subsidy Policy  
First, in the no-subsidy case, by substitution of relevant profit equations (18) and 
(20) into sector surplus equation (37), we find the farmer’s equilibrium share of sector 





















Note the share distribution is independent of the output price the relative elasticity of the 
factors.  These results would not hold if parameters, a and/or b, were allowed to vary 
across inputs.  
Figure 11, shows how an increase in technical substitutability ( 0   ) strictly 
increases (decreases) the farmer’s (input suppliers’) percentage share of sector surplus at 
an increasing (decreasing) rate.  As such, surplus distribution is the poorest for the farmer 
when inputs are relatively close complements.  However, as demonstrated in figure 10, 
the farmer’s profits are the highest for relatively close complements.  In all, the modeling 
approach identifies the tension between market power, realized surplus and surplus 
distribution, all driven by the complementarity of the inputs.  In the sections that follow, I 
will demonstrate the impact these tensions will have on sector welfare in the presence of 
a positive subsidy. 
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Figure 11 No-Subsidy: Equilibrium Percentage Sector Surplus Distribution of Farmer 
and Input Suppliers  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and 1   
Fixed Subsidy Policy  
I examine the welfare distribution in the presence of a fixed subsidy.  First I 
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 (40) 
and has a constant rate of impact on the sector surplus which is equivalent to G.   
By substitution of the farmer’s fixed subsidy (23) and input supplier’s profit (20) 
into profit share (37) results in the farmer’s equilibrium share of sector surplus of 
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and increase at a rate of 
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 ( 2 ) ( 1 )
( (3 2 ) ( 2 ) (1 ))
FSE
Fs a bP
G a P bG
 
  
     

       with respect to G. 
The input suppliers’ equilibrium share of sector surplus is 
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 with respect to a 
fixed lump sum payment of G.  Notice that when 0G   , 
NSE FSE
F Fs s and , ,
NSE FSE
L S L Ss s .  
Figure 12 demonstrates that the fixed subsidy has (i) a positive impact on available sector 
surplus, (ii) a positive impact on the farmer’s share, and (iii) a negative impact on input 
suppliers’ share.  
 
Figure 12 Fixed Subsidy Relative Profit Shares In Comparison to No Subsidy Profit  
Shares 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and G=1 
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Coupled subsidy  
To gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the coupled subsidy, with 
substitution of firm profits (33) and (35) into the denominator of (37) I demonstrate that 
sector total surplus available in the market (given, market is in equilibrium) with a 
coupled subsidy is  
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The multiplier effect of the coupled subsidy can then be calculated as  
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Although the coupled subsidy resulted in higher input prices, the expansion affect 
in input quantity results in a positive multiplier effect.  Figure 13 demonstrates that the 
multiplier effect diminishes as input substitutability increases and is strictly greater than 
the fixed subsidy policy. 
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Figure 13 Multiplier Effect on Total Sector Surplus In the Presence of a Coupled 
Subsidy  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and α=1 
The equilibrium profit share is for the farmer, landowner and seed firm are  
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Finally, I demonstrate in figure 14 that the subsidy distribution disproportionally 
improves the affiliated input market (L) over the non-affiliated input market (S).  
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Figure 14 Coupled Subsidy Relative Profit Shares  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1 
Now, I graphically summarize the subsidy incidence, as defined by the resulting 
sector welfare distribution, from the three subsidy policies (no, fixed and coupled) on 
sector welfare distribution.  Figure 15 demonstrates that the famer realizes the greatest 
improvement in percent surplus share under the fixed subsidy policy, more so as inputs 
become closer substitutes.  Interestingly, though the farmer’s profits increase under a 
coupled subsidy policy, the improvement in surplus distribution is modest in relation to 
no-subsidy policy.  Overall, the improvement in the farmer’s surplus distribution as 
inputs become closer substitutes is due to the Bertrand competition between the input 
suppliers. 
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Figure 15 Famer’s Retention of Sector Surplus (i.e. Profit Share) Over Three 
Alternative Subsidy Policies 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=1 and α=1 
Figure 16 provides a graphical summary of the percent distribution of total sector 
surplus for the landowner and seed firm across the various subsidy policies.  For all 
policies, the landowner and seed firm have nearly unchanging and symmetric surplus 
shares when the inputs are nearly perfect complements.  As inputs become closer 
substitutes, however, under a fixed subsidy policy, input supplier surplus shares are 
symmetrically lower than the no-subsidy.  Under a coupled subsidy policy, the 
affiliated/non-affiliated input supplier’s surplus distribution is greater/less than both the 
no and fixed subsidy policy.  Overall, the degenerative surplus distribution as inputs 
become closer substitutes is due to the Bertrand competition between the input suppliers. 
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Figure 16 Landowner and Seed Firm Profit Shares Over Three Alternative Subsidy 
Policies 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=84 and α=1 
Dominate Buyer (DB): Monopolist Seed Manufacturer vs. a Monopsonist Farmer 
Market power scenario two occurs when the buyer (farmer) dominates the market 
and forces the landowner (seller) to accept the set price.  Accordingly, the farmer will 
force the landowner to sell at his marginal cost and in this case, price is determined to be 
zero due to the underlying assumptions of the model.  Specifically, the input suppliers 
have zero marginal cost and equating marginal cost to marginal profit (i.e. price) is the 
profit maximizing point when the landowner is perfectly competitive and is subject to the 
farmer’s market power.  In this model, the seed firm is still acting as a monopolist over 
their respective complementary good, thus they are taking the complementarity of two 
goods into account when they maximize profit.   
 
 52  
The details and step-by-step solutions for all three subsidy policies are outlined as 
followed.  The section begins with derivation of the baseline scenario, a market with no 
subsidy policy.  The no subsidy case is followed by a fixed lump sum payment 
mechanism then finally the coupled subsidy mechanism.  After all theoretical solutions 
are derived; the surplus distributions of all three policy cases will be discussed.  
No Subsidy Policy (NS_DB) 
The industry structure and competitive relationship assumptions are as follows.  
To begin, the representative farmer remains a profit maximizer.  I maintain the 
assumption that the farmer takes output price (P) and input cost of seed as given.  
However, in the dominate buyer case the famer sets the price of land.   
I first derive the results when there is no subsidy policy in place and this 
represents the baseline of comparison to other subsidy policies.  To start, I substitute the 
dominate buyer price of land into the Bertrand reaction functions (14).  Using the 
reactions function from the dominate seller case and substituting 0 for the cost of land 
results in 
 _ 1  ( )
2
NSE DB
Sw aP aP  . (47)  
Equation (47) is the reaction function of the seed manufacture to the price set for 
land by the farmer.  It is also the subgame perfect equilibrium price for the seed 
manufacture because the price of land is zero.  Therefore, the seed supplier optimally 
exerts market power and as in the dominate seller (DS) caser chooses price above 


















   , 
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for all conventional restrictions of parameter values.  Therefore, the degree of market 
power is a function of substitutability and the effect of a change in substitutability in the 
dominate buyer case is larger than in the original dominate seller case.  As depicted 
below in figure 17 the seed supplier’s ability, in the dominate buyer scenario, to set prices 
above those in the dominate seller case, increases as 1  . 
 
Figure 17 No-Subsidy Dominate Buyer: Equilibrium Input Prices 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1. 
Given the equilibrium prices from stage one; I now return to stage two, the 
farmer’s equilibrium choices of input quantities and resulting profit.  By substitution of 
the equilibrium, input price equation (47) into factor demand equations (7) results in the 
equilibrium quantities of land and seed,  
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It is important to note that the relationship between input substitutability and optimal 
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Figure 18 demonstrates this convex relationship over the range of input 
complementarity.  Specifically, it shows that an increase in complementarity increases 
optimal factor quantity, thus substitutability and quantity have an inverse relation.   
 
Figure 18 NSE (Dominate Buyer) Factor Quantities of Farmer Facing Bertrand 
Competitors for a Range of Compliments 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1 
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Therefore, as technical complementarity increases, the optimal input quantities 
increase.  Furthermore, by extension it is necessary that the commodity output increases 
per the farmer’s technology (1).  By comparing figures 17 and 18, it is readily apparent 
that increasing technical complementarity increases both market power and production.  
The output result is not intuitively obvious as increasing market power typically results in 
lower outputs, and hence reduced surplus to the buyer.  
Next, I will examine the impacts of technical input complementarity on the 
profitability of farmer, and then input suppliers.  Starting with the Farmer, by substitution 
of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (47) and quantities (48) 
into the farmer’s profit function (3) I find  the farmer’s equilibrium profit when he is a 
dominate buyer of land as 
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The farmer’s equilibrium profit is strictly concave as 
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. (51) 
As can be seen in figure 19, _NSE DB NSEF F   for all conventional parameters, thus 
the farmer benefits when he market power, regardless of the degree of complimentarily.   
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Figure 19 Optimal Profit of Farmer Facing Bertrand Competitors for Dominate Buyer 
and Dominate Seller Market Power Cases  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1 
Next, looking at upstream input suppliers, by substitution of the corresponding 
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium input prices (47) and quantities (48) into the 
supplier’s profit functions (11) I find the equilibrium profit of the land supplier, given the 
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It is the case that seed supplier profit is strictly decreasing in the substitutability of their 
input as  
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As can be seen in figure 20, for various degrees of input complementarity, the 
highest profit for the seed manufacture occurs when the farmer is a dominate buyer in the 
land rental market, when input products are nearly perfect complements. 
 
Figure 20 NSE Optimal Profit of Farmer and Input Suppliers (Land and Seed)   
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1 and b=1 
Interestingly by comparing figures 19 and 20, the increase in the seed firms 
market power (which results from the farmers gain of market power in the land market) 
as indicated by higher input prices, results in higher, not lower, buyer profits.  The reason 
for this apparently counter intuitive result is due to the expansionary effects in 
input/output depicted in figure 18 as input complementarity increases.  Therefore, buyer 
surplus increases when inputs are close complements and to a greater degree when 
market power is transferred to the buyer.  Again, increasing the complementarity between 
technical inputs i) increases market power,  ii) unilaterally increases sector surplus, but 
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iii) decreases available sector surplus.  However, in the dominate buyer scenario 
increasing complementarity allows the seed supplier to exert an ‘even’ more aggressive 
pricing strategy.    
Fixed subsidy Policy (FS) 
The first subsidy analyzed is a decoupled payment mechanism, which is 
commonly referred to as a fixed subsidy.  Given the assumed separable influence of G,  
subsequent subgame perfect solutions of the dynamic game outlined in the previous 
section will equal those observed under the no-subsidy policy.  By substitution of the 
subgame perfect input prices (47) and quantities (48) into the farmer’s profit (22), the 
farmer’s new equilibrium profit is  
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   . (54) 
The direct effect of decoupled payments is that the fixed subsidy improves the 
farmer’s sector surplus and does not distort input market prices and quantities under the 
assumption that G is a separable influence on the farmer’s investment decision.  
Furthermore, it is true that the NSE of the in the DB case is greater than in the DS market 
power situation. 
Coupled subsidy Policy (CS) 
Moving forward with the dominate buyer case; I will now address the changes in 
the presence of the coupled subsidy policy.  To solve for the case where the buyer 
(farmer) has complete monopsony power in the land market with the addition of a 
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coupled subsidy.  I substitute the monopsony price of land (zero) into the seed firm’s 
reaction function (28) which result in  
 _ 1 ( (1 ) )
2
CSE DB
Sw aP     . (55) 
This is the reaction function of the seed manufacture to the landowner.  It is also the 
subgame perfect equilibrium price for seed when the farmer is able to set the price of land 
to zero from his complete monopsony power in the land market.  By taking the 
comparative static of (55) in relation to the subsidy, it is observed that  
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Thus, the coupled subsidy tied to the quantity of land strategically allows the seed 







 , for all conventional 
parameters. 
Figure 21 maps the optimal price of the seed provider in relation to a range of 
substitutability.  The seed provider is able to charge a higher price for some (higher) 
degrees of complementary between inputs.  Furthermore, the seed supplier is better off in 
the dominate buyer case when the inputs are close to perfect complements since it is 
optimal for him to choose a higher price in relation to the price he was able to choose 
when the landowner held monopoly power.   
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Figure 21 The Bertrand Seed Manufacture Optimal Price of Seed Over Varying 
Substitutability for the Dominate Seller and Buyer Cases  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and α=1 
The input quantity decision by the farmer occurring in stage two follows.  By 
substitution of the corresponding input providers’ subgame perfect equilibrium prices 
(55) into the farmer factor demands (25) results in the asymmetric subgame perfect 
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It can be shown that _ _ 0  ( , , ) 0 and -1 0CSE DB CSE DBF FL S a P        .  
Therefore, the coupled subsidy also conveys a strategic output advantage to the affiliated 
firm (L).  However, since the landowner now takes price as given, the landowner is not 
able to capitalize on this advantage.  As demonstrated in figure 22, the equilibrium 
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quantity of land (affiliated input) and seed (non-affiliated input) are greater for all 
degrees of technical complementarity under a coupled subsidy policy in relation to a no 
and fixed subsidy policies.  Additionally, by comparing figure 22 with figure 9 it is 
observable that the equilibrium quantity of land and seed are greater in the dominate 
buyer case. 
 
Figure 22 Optimal Factor Quantities of Dominate Buyer (Farmer) for a Range of  
Compliments 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1) 
In relation to sector profits, by substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect 
equilibrium prices (55) and quantities (57) into the profit function (20) results in the 
farmer’s equilibrium profit 
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Additionally, as shown in figure 23 the farmer’s profit is strictly convex for 
appropriate restrictions on the parameters and reaches a minimum at 0  , as was the 
case in the when the seller had complete market power over land.  To address the impact 
of   on the farmer’s profit (58), I use the comparative statistic with respect to the 
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for all conventional parameters. 
In Figure 23 the farmer’s monopsony profit is shown in relation to the price 
taking profit of the farmer for a range of substitutability.  The farmer’s profit is strictly 
improved in this dominate buyer case in comparison to when he was subject to a 
dominate seller.  Thus, the ability to drive land prices to marginal cost provides the 
farmer with a greater surplus. 
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Figure 23 CSE Profits of Farmer in the Dominate Buyer vs. Dominate Seller Cases  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1 
By substitution of the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium prices (55) and 
quantities (57) into the landowner and seed firm profit functions (11) results in the 
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Next, I will use the comparative statistic to analyze the impact of the subsidy on 
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for all conventional parameters. 
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Figure 24 summarizes the profits of the seed firm for the dominate buyer and 
dominate seller cases, for the range of technical input complementarity.  The seed firm 
greatly benefits when the farmer is a dominate buyer for all values of complementarity 
(but note no difference when inputs are technically independent).  Furthermore, the 
benefits gained by the seed from increase as complementarity increases.  Thus, the non-
affiliated supplier receives a large positive spillover effects when i) supplying a nearly 
perfect complement to the affiliated input and ii) the buyer holds market power in the 
affiliated complementary input market. 
 
Figure 24 CSE Seed Firms Profit In Dominate Buyer Case vs Dominate Seller  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1 
Summary of Sector Welfare Distribution Per Subsidy Policy   
Again, to gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the no-subsidy policy, 
fixed and coupled subsidy, I analyze the distribution of the total sector surplus in relation 
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to product substitutability (34).  First, in the no-subsidy case, by substitution of relevant 
profit equations (51) and (52) into sector surplus equation (37), I find the farmer’s 
































As demonstrated in figure 25, as technical complementarity decreases (increases) 
the farmer (suppliers) percentage of sector share of sector surplus increases (decreases) at 
an decreasing (increasing) rate.  As such, surplus distribution is the poorest for the farmer 
when inputs are relatively perfect complements, just as is the case when the farmer is 
subject to a dominate seller in the land rental market.  However, as demonstrated earlier, 
the farmer’s profits are the highest for relatively close complements.  Additionally, the 
seed manufacture (for σ < -0.3) and farmer (for all values of σ) are mutually better off, in 
comparison to the dominate seller case.  The seed supplier is able to more than half  of 
the sector surplus when the farmer is able to force the rental rate of land to the 
landowners marginal cost, when then goods approach nearly perfect complements.  
Inversely, the famer gains an advantage as the inputs increase in substitutability.  In all, 
our modeling approach identifies the tension between market power, realized surplus and 
surplus distribution, all driven by the complementarity of the inputs.  In the sections that 
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follow, I will demonstrate the impact these tensions will have on sector welfare in the 
presence of a positive input subsidy. 
 
Figure 25 NSE Relative Optimal Profit Share of Farmer and Bertrand Competitors in 
Dominate Buyer vs Dominate Seller 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, and b=1 
I examine the welfare distribution in the presence of a fixed subsidy, by 
substitution of the farmer’s fixed subsidy profit (54) and input supplier’s profit (52) into 
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Taking the competitive static of (64), in relation to the fixed subsidy, it is 
observable that  
 




16 ( 1) 0
(8 (1 ) (7 ))
FSE DB
Fs a bP





    ,
 (65) 
for all conventional parameters and G not equal to 0.   
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and notice that when 0G   , 
_ _NSE DB FSE DB
F Fs s and 
_ _
, ,
NSE DB FSE DB
L S L Ss s .  Figure 26 
demonstrates that the fixed subsidy, as in the dominate seller case, has (i) a positive 
impact on the farmer’s share, and (ii) a negative impact on input suppliers’ share.  
However, the famer’s gain in market power has a strictly positive impact on the farmer’s 
profit share as compared to the dominate seller case (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 26 Fixed Subsidy Relative Profit Shares In Comparison to No Subsidy Profit  
Shares 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and G=1 
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Next, to gain insight into the aggregate welfare impacts of the coupled subsidy, 
with substitution of the farmer and supplier profits (58) and (60) into the denominator of 
(34) I demonstrate that sector total surplus available in the market (given, market is in 
equilibrium) with a coupled subsidy is  
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and is strictly convex with respect to the coupled subsidy.  Although the coupled subsidy 
resulted in higher input prices, the expansion affect in input quantity results in a positive 
multiplier effect.  Figure 27 demonstrates that the multiplier effect diminishes as input 
substitutability increases and is strictly greater than the fixed subsidy policy.  
Additionally, the multiplier effect on total sector surplus is strictly greater in dominate 
buyer case, than the dominate seller case (figure 13)  
 
 69  
 
Figure 27 Multiplier Effect on Total Sector Surplus In the Presence of a Coupled 
Subsidy   
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1 and α=1 
The equilibrium profit share is for the farmer, landowner and seed firm are  
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Finally, I demonstrate in figure 28 that the subsidy distribution inversely improves 
for the farmer and seed firm with addition of the coupled subsidy.  The subsidy does not 
impact the profit share of the farmer nor seed supplier when the inputs are near perfect 
complements; and the seed supplier and farmer are strictly better off in comparison to 
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dominate seller case.  Thus, the seed firm is able to extract more of the spillover effects 
from the subsidy payment, when the famer gains monopsony power in the land market.  
In all, the important conclusion is when a famer gains countervailing market power it 
mainly benefits the upstream monopoly, in this case the seed manufacture. 
 
Figure 28 Coupled Subsidy Relative Profit Shares  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, and α=1 
Now, I graphically summarize the subsidy incidence, as defined by the resulting 
sector welfare distribution, from the three subsidy policies (no, fixed and coupled) on 
sector welfare distribution.  Figure 29 demonstrates that the famer realizes the greatest 
improvement in percent surplus share under the coupled subsidy policy, more so as inputs 
become closer substitutes.  This is a change from the dominate seller case, in which the 
fixed subsidy provide the famer with the greatest retention of the subsidy and sector 
surplus.  Interestingly, unlike the dominate seller case the farmer’s profits increase under 
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a coupled subsidy policy, and the farmer realizes an improvement in surplus distribution 
compared to the other polices.  The improvement in the farmer’s surplus distribution as 
inputs become closer substitutes is due to the Bertrand competition between the input 
suppliers, and the new power retained by the farmer in the land market.  As a result, the 
farmer is able to capture (although it is only a portion) added surplus from the addition of 
the coupled subsidy that was extracted by the landowner in the dominate seller case. 
 
Figure 29 Famer’s Retention of Sector Surplus (i.e. Profit Share) Over Three 
Alternative Subsidy Policies 
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=1 and α=1 
Figure 30 provides a graphical summary of the percent distribution of total sector 
surplus for the seed firm across the various subsidy policies.  For all policies, the seed 
firm has nearly unchanging and symmetric surplus shares when the inputs are nearly 
perfect complements.  As inputs become closer substitutes, however, under a fixed 
subsidy policy, input supplier surplus shares are lower than the no-subsidy.  Overall, the 
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degenerative surplus distribution as inputs become closer substitutes is due to the 
Bertrand competition between the input suppliers. 
  
Figure 30 Seed Firm Profit Shares Over Three Alternative Subsidy Policies  
Note: Parameter Assumptions a=2, P=1, b=1, G=1 and α=1 
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODS 
Experimental markets can be designed to study the economics of decision making in an 
existing trading institution, i.e. land and seed market for agriculture commodity 
production.  Generally, development of laboratory markets are key to providing empirical 
evidence to support (or not) theoretical expectations related to market behaviors (Davis 
and Holt, 1993).  Sufficient empirical evidence of subsidy incidence is lacking primarily 
due to the lack of adequate data to test theoretical predictions.  Experimental economics 
also allows researchers to control for extraneous factors and compare policy options.  The 
Organization for Economic and Development notes, “a potential avenue for research in 
the area [of investigating farmer’s expectations concerning policy] could come from 
applying some experimental economics” (OECD, 2005).   
Using the partial equilibrium game theoretic model for the dominate sellers, I will 
determine how the interaction of the two input suppliers, in technically separate markets, 
affects i) prices, ii) profits (i.e. payoffs in the laboratory market),  iii) percent of sector 
surplus retention; across three alternative subsidy polices in the laboratory market and iv) 
sector welfare.  Using theory as the guide to design the experiments allows for the 
construction of identifiable testable hypotheses.  This chapter is laid out as follows.  In 
the experimental design section, I will outline the hypotheses, and design of the three 
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treatments.  This will then be followed by a brief review of the laboratory market 
procedures used to conduct the experiment.  
Experimental Design  
The laboratory market is a controlled experimental environment, allowing for the 
isolation of specific variables that induce a change in subject behavior, and therefore 
market outcomes.  Changes in the laboratory setting are made to conduct policy treatment 
hypothesis testing.  However, for  valid hypothesis testing, it is imperative to keep the 
market ‘true’ to the theory.  Thus, I design the experiment to include the fundamentals of 
the production process and trading mechanisms that are embedded within the theoretical 
modelling framework.  This permits the laboratory market to test for causality of the 
economic factors of interest.  In all, even though the laboratory market setting does not 
account for all production complexities of the industry sector, the results are will still 
informative.  
Developing the Hypotheses   
In the classical Bertrand differentiated products model, Bertrand non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium prices are above marginal cost .  The dynamic 2-stage theoretical model 
uses the best response functions of the input suppliers, thus providing a unique subgame 
perfect prediction for each player’s strategy.  This section first outlines the analytical 
results for an assumed set of parameters.  The results are then used to formulate the 
testable hypotheses. 
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Analytical Results  
I provide a general description of the dominant seller models (depicted in 
equations 15,16,18,20,23,29,31,33,35,38,39,41,42,45 and 46) for a given set of 
parameters, which are: P=1, a=2, b=1, σ = -0.99, G=84, and α=1.  I outline the 
analytical results of the dominate seller outcomes for the no subsidy, fix subsidy and 
coupled subsidy policies.  The most important assumption I make is the near perfect 
technical complementarity between land and seed to represent the importance they have 
to one another in the production process.   
The results demonstrate that only the farmer’s surplus rises with a fixed payment.  
However, under a coupled policy input prices, input quantities, profits, and sector surplus 
(welfare) rise.  Interestingly, with nearly perfect technical complement inputs, the subsidy 
payment under a coupled policy is less than the increase in sector welfare; whereas, the 
increase in welfare is equal to the subsidy payment for the fixed subsidy policy. Thus, 
only the coupled subsidy payment results in a multiplier effect.  
I will first present the expected equilibriums for the no subsidy case (NS), then 
move to the fixed subsidy (FS) and conclude with the coupled subsidy (CS) predictions.    
No Subsidy Policy Equilibrium Predictions (NSE) 
Given the set of parameters previously noted, in Table 1 I provide the No subsidy 
equilibrium (NSE) predictions for prices, profits and welfare distributions.    
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Table 1 No Subsidy Policy Equilibrium (NSE) Predictions  
Variable NSE Prediction  
Price of Land 1.3311 
Price of Seed 1.3311 
Farmer Profit 44.74 
Landowner Profit 89.03 
Seed Supplier Profit 89.03 
Farmer Percent of Sector Surplus 20% 
Landowner Percent of Sector Surplus 40% 
Seed Supplier Percent of Sector Surplus 40% 
Parameter Assumptions: P=1, a=2, b=1, and σ=-0.99 
Fixed Subsidy Policy Equilibrium Predictions (FSE) 
In Table 2 I present the Fixed Subsidy Equilibrium (FSE) predictions of prices, 
profits and welfare distributions.  The decoupled mechanism consists of the Buyer 
receiving an external source of revenue for 84 tokens.  This payment of 84 tokens is 
assumed to allow for comparisons with the coupled subsidy treatment because in 
equilibrium the buyer receives approximately 84 tokens from the coupled subsidy.  
 
 77  
Table 2 Fixed Subsidy Policy Equilibrium (FSE) Predictions  
Variable FSE Prediction  
Price of Land 1.3311 
Price of Seed 1.3311 
Farmer Profit 128.74 
Landowner Profit 89.03 
Seed Supplier Profit 89.03 
Total Sector Surplus 306.82 
Farmer Percent of Sector Surplus 42% 
Landowner Percent of Sector Surplus 29% 
Seed Supplier Percent of Sector Surplus 29% 
Parameter Assumptions P=1, a=2, b=1, σ=-0.99, and G=84 
Coupled Subsidy Policy Equilibrium Predictions (CSE) 
In Table 3 I provide the coupled subsidy equilibrium (CSE) predictions for prices, 
profits and welfare distributions.  
Table 3 Coupled  Subsidy Policy Equilibrium (CSE) Predictions  
Variable CSE Prediction  
Price of Land 1.669 
Price of Seed 1.659 
Farmer Profit 70.04 
Landowner Profit 139.95 
Seed Supplier Profit 138.29 
Farmer Percent of Sector Surplus 20% 
Landowner Percent of Sector Surplus 40.2% 
Seed Supplier Percent of Sector Surplus 39.8% 
Parameter Assumptions P=1, a=2, b=1, σ = -0.99, and α=1 
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Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are formed from the theoretical predictions per policy and for 
comparison across the alternative subsidy policies. The alternative subsidy policies 
represent the experimental treatments.  I will first present the hypothesis relating to the 
theoretical predictions of prices, payoffs and welfare distributions for the NSE, FSE and 
CSE.  This will be followed by hypotheses concerning the differences of prices, profits 
and welfare across the alternative subsidy polies (i.e. the treatment effect).  
Hypothesis: Theoretical Predictions  
Using Tables 1, 2, and 3, I formulate the numeric predictions for my hypotheses.  
I first present prices across all three subsidy policies, in Table 4 and conclude with 
presenting the hypotheses for welfare distributions in Table 6.  
Price Hypotheses  
In table 4 I mathematically present the four null hypotheses, which relate to the 
pricing strategies (decisions) of the input suppliers.  
i. Price Hypothesis One: From the theoretical predictions, in a market with 
no subsidy, the landowner’s pricing decision will not statistically differ 
from 1.33.  In addition, difference between the price of land and price of 
seed will not statistically deviate from zero.  
ii. Price Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed 
subsidy policy is introduced into the market, the landowner’s pricing 
decision will not statistically differ from 1.33.  And difference between the 
price of land and price of seed will not statistically deviate from zero.  
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iii. Price Hypothesis Three: From the theoretical predictions, in the coupled 
subsidy policy the landowner will make a pricing decision that does not 
statistically differ from 1.67.   
iv. Price Hypothesis Four: From the theoretical predictions, in the coupled 
subsidy policy the seed supplier will make pricing decisions that not 
statistically differ from 1.66.    
Table 4 Price Hypothesis From Theoretical Predictions   










L SH w w    
iii. CSE 3 : 1.67L
w
LH w    
iv. CSE 4 : 1.66s
w
SH w    
Notes: Price of land and Price of Seed L Sw w   
Profits (Payoffs) Hypothesis 
In table 5 I mathematically present the seven hypotheses, which relate to the 
resulting profits of the farmer and input suppliers across the three subsidies polices.    
i. Payoff Hypothesis One: From the theoretical predictions, in the no 
subsidy policy case, payoffs earned by the landowner will not statistically 
differ from 89.03.  And difference between the payoffs earned by the 
landowner and seed supplier will not statistically deviate from zero. 
ii. Payoff Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when the 
market has no subsidy policy the payoffs earned by the famer will not 
statistically differ from 44.74.  
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iii. Payoff Hypothesis Three: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed 
subsidy is introduced into the market the payoffs earned by the landowner 
will not statistically differ from 89.03.  And difference between the 
payoffs earned by the landowner and seed supplier will not statistically 
deviate from zero.  
iv. Payoff Hypothesis Four: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed 
subsidy is introduced into the market the payoffs earned by the famer will 
not statistically differ from 128.74.   
v. Payoff Hypothesis Five: From the theoretical predictions, when a coupled 
subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market the 
payoffs earned by the landowner will not statistically differ from 139.95.   
vi. Payoff Hypothesis Six: From the theoretical predictions, when a coupled 
subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market the 
payoffs earned by the seed supplier will not statistically differ from 
138.29.  
vii. Payoff Hypothesis Seven: From the theoretical predictions, when a 
coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market 
the payoffs earned by the famer will not statistically differ from 70.04.   
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Table 5 Payoff  Hypothesis From Theoretical Predictions   
Payoff Hypothesis  Subsidy Policy  Prediction  
i.  NSE 
,
1 : 89.03L S L SH
       
ii. NSE 2 : 44.74F FH
     
iii.   FSE 
,
3 : 89.03L S L SH
       
iv. FSE 4 : 128.74F LH
     
v. CSE 5 : 139.95L LH
     
vi. CSE 6 : 138.29S SH
     
vii. CSE 7 : 70.04F FH
     
Payoff to Landowner,  is the payoff to seed supplier, and  is the payoff of the farmer.   L S F  
 
Welfare Distribution Hypothesis 
In table 6 I mathematically present the seven hypotheses, which relate to the 
resulting welfare distributions of total sector surplus or what percent of the total sector 
surplus is retained by famer and input suppliers across the three subsidies polices.    
i. Welfare Hypothesis One: From the theoretical predictions, in the no 
subsidy policy case the percentage of sector surplus retained by the 
landowner will not statistically differ from 40 percent.  And difference 
between the percent of sector surplus earned by the landowner and seed 
supplier will not statistically deviate from zero. 
ii. Welfare Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when the 
market has no subsidy policy, the famer’s percent of sector surplus will 
not statistically differ from 20 percent.   
iii. Welfare Hypothesis Three: From the theoretical predictions, when a fixed 
payment is introduced, the percentage of sector surplus retained by the 
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landowner will not statistically differ from 29 percent.  And difference 
between the percent of sector surplus earned by the landowner and seed 
supplier will not statistically deviate from zero. 
iv. Welfare Hypothesis Four: From the theoretical predictions, when the 
market has the addition of a fixed subsidy payment, the famer’s percent of 
sector surplus will not statistically differ from 42 percent.   
v. Welfare Hypothesis Five: From the theoretical predictions, when a 
coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market, 
the percent of sector surplus retained by the landowner will not 
statistically differ from 40.2 percent.   
vi. Welfare Hypothesis Six: From the theoretical predictions, when a coupled 
subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market, the 
percent of sector surplus earned by the seed supplier will not statistically 
differ from 39.8 percent.     
vii. Welfare Hypothesis Seven: From the theoretical predictions, when a 
coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market, 
the percent of sector surplus earned by the famer will not statistically 
differ from 20 percent.   
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Table 6 Welfare Hypothesis From Theoretical Predictions 
Payoff Hypothesis  Subsidy Policy  Prediction  
i.  NSE 
,
1 0.40: L S L S
s s s sH     
ii. NSE 2 : 0.20F F
s sH    
iii.   FSE 
,
3 : 0.29L S
s s
L SH s s    
iv. FSE 4 : 0.42F
s
LH s    
v. CSE 5 : 0.402L
s
LH s    
vi. CSE 6 : 0.398S
s
SH s    
vii. CSE 7 : 0.20F
s
FH s    
Notes: 
,  are the the landowner and seed supplier's percent share of sector surplus






Hypothesis: Predictions of Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices  
Using Tables 1, 2, and 3, I formulate the numeric predictions of my treatment 
effect hypotheses.  I first present prices across all three subsidy policies, in Table 7 and 
conclude with presenting the hypothesis for welfare distributions in Table 9. 
Price Hypotheses  
In table 7 I mathematically present the two hypotheses, which relate to the pricing 
decisions of the input suppliers and how theory predicts expected prices (i.e. the input 
suppliers’ pricing strategies) to change across the alternative policies.   
i. Price Hypothesis One: The addition of the fixed subsidy will not 
statistically alter the price of land from the non-subsidy case.  And the 
price of land and price of seed should not statically differ from one 
another, as the FSE price of seed should not statistically differ from the 
NSE price.   
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ii. Price Hypothesis Two:  The addition of the coupled subsidy, tied to the 
price of land, will result in the input suppliers’ strategically raising prices 
above the NSE prices.  Thus the CSE prices will be statistically greater 
than the NSE prices or land seed. 
Table 7 Price Hypothesis Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices (Treatments) 
Price Hypothesis  Subsidy Policy  Prediction  




L S L S
w wH w w   
ii. NSE, CSE , ,
,
2  : L S
NSE CSE
S L L S
w w w wH    
Notes: Price of land and Price of Seed L Sw w   
Profits (Payoffs) Hypothesis   
In table 8 I mathematically present the four hypotheses, which relate the profits of 
the farmer and input suppliers and how they change with the interaction of alternative 
subsidy policies  
i.  Payoff Hypothesis One: The addition of the fixed payment will not 
statistically alter the profit of the input providers from the NSE profits.  
ii. Payoff Hypothesis Two: From the theoretical predictions, when the farmer 
receives a fixed lump sum payment, the result is an increase in profits, 
thus the farmers FSE payoff is greater than the famers NSE payoffs.  
iii. Payoff Hypothesis Three: The coupled subsidy tied to the quantity choice 
of land will increase the profits of the input suppliers, thus the input 
supplier CSE profits will be statistically greater than the NSE profits.  
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iv. Payoff Hypothesis Four: The coupled subsidy tied the quantity choice of 
land will increase the profits of the farmer, thus the famer’s CSE profits 
will be statistically greater than the NSE profits.  
Table 8 Payoff  Hypothesis Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices (Treatments) 
Payoff Hypothesis  Subsidy Policy  Prediction  
i. NSE, FSE , ,
,
1 : L S
NSE FSE
L S L SH
 
    
ii.  NSE, FSE 2 : F
NSE FSE
F FH
     
iii.   NSE, CSE , ,
,
3  : L S
NSE CSE
L S L SCH
 
    
iv. NSE, CSE 4 :F
NSE CSE
F FH
     
Notes: 
Payoff to Landowner,  is the payoff to seed supplier, and  is the payoff of the farmer.   L S F  
 
Welfare Distribution Hypothesis   
In table 9 I mathematically present the four hypotheses, which relate the welfare 
distributions of the farmer and input suppliers and how they change with the introduction 
of alternative subsidy policies.    
i.  Welfare Hypothesis One: The addition of the fixed payment will 
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the input providers from the 
NSE case.  Thus, the input supplier FSE percent of sector surplus is 
statistically less than the NSE percent of sector surplus.       
ii. Payoff Hypothesis Two: The addition of the fixed payment will 
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the famer from the NSE case.  
Thus, the famer FSE percent of sector surplus is statistically greater than 
the NSE percent of sector surplus.      
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iii. Welfare Hypothesis Three: The addition of the coupled subsidy will not 
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the input providers from the 
NSE case.   
iv. Payoff Hypothesis Four: The addition of the coupled subsidy will not 
statistically alter the surplus distributions of the famer from the NSE case.   
Table 9 Welfare  Hypothesis Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices (Treatments) 
Payoff Hypothesis  Subsidy Policy  Prediction  
i.  NSE, FSE , ,
,
1 : L LS S
NSE FSE
s s s s
L Ss s s sH    
ii.  NSE, FSE 2 : F F
NSE FSE
s s
Fs s sH    
iii.   NSE, CSE , ,
,
3 : L LS S
NSE CSE
s s s s
L Ss s s sH    
iv.  NSE, CSE 4 : F F
NSE CSE
s s
Fs s sH    
Notes: 
,  are the the landowner and seed supplier's percent of sector surplus







The experimental market specified within this section follows directly from 
developed theory and resulting hypotheses.  The elements of a game theory model differ 
from other structural modeling techniques by accounting for the strategic interactions 
between players.  As such, a player’s payoff is not solely dependent upon his actions but 
also the actions of others in his trading group.  Accordingly, the experiment (treatments 
1, 2 and 3) consist of players, possible actions, and a clearly defined set of information 
(i.e. rules of the game). 
The experiment consists of three treatments, each comprising solely one of the 
three conducted sessions.  Treatment 1 tested a market with no subsidy policy, treatment 
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2 a market in which the famer received a fixed payment, and the treatment 3 a market in 
the presence of the coupled subsidy.  The experiment, across all three treatments, is a 
three-player game involving two input providers and a buyer.  The players are denoted as 
follows:  
i. The landowner as the Seller of product A 
ii. The seed firm as the Seller of product B 
iii. The famer as the buyer of products A and B, denoted as Buyer C.  
Each treatment required 18 subjects, 6 as sellers of product A, 6 as sellers of product B, 
and the additional 6 as Buyer C.  Each treatment contained 6 trading groups comprised of 
only 1 product A seller, 1 product B seller and 1 Buyer.  The experiments last for 20 
rounds to mimic multiple production seasons, plus the trading groups are randomly 
matched over all 20 trading rounds (and the 3 practice rounds).  This is done to minimize 
reputation, personal relationship effects and collusion.  
The same general structure exists across all three treatments.  In the experimental 
market, just as in the theoretical model, the two input suppliers are Bertrand competitors.  
Thus, in stage 1,they must make simultaneous pricing decisions within a specified range 
of prices.  The price ranges directly follow the extremes of the dominate buyer case.  
In stage 2 of the experiment, the Buyer does not make an output decision but is 
subject to the pricing decisions of the Sellers.  As such, the Sellers face a perfectly 
rational Buyer.  While, it would have required fewer funds to conduct the experiment 
without the buyer, the benefit of including the presence of the Buyer is to allow for a 
behavioral effect from sellers.  For instance, collusion among the sellers would 
necessarily impact a person and not simply the experimenter.  Thus, including the 
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presence of a real (albeit fully rational) buyer simulates a more realistic behavioral 
(market) setting.  
Stage 2 then progresses with the payoff for each player being realized.  The 
profits of player A are a function of his own price and the price set by seller B, and the 
Product B seller’s payoff is a function of his own price and the price of product B.  
Finally, the Buyer who is subject to these prices realizes his payoff, which is function of 
the prices of A and B (and quantity which is emended within the profit maximizing 
computer generated choice).  
Additionally, treatments two and three each introduce an alternative subsidy 
policy.  As such, each has an updated payoff table, and treatment three has an updated 
pricing range to relay the change within the market.  The section continues with a brief 
summation of the three treatments.  
Treatment 1 (Baseline Treatment): No Subsidy Policy (NS)  
Treatment one is the baseline treatment and is conducted with no subsidy policy.  
Here, I synthesize the instructions, with the full set of the instructions and payoff tables 
are located in Appendix B. 
In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different 
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).  Each trading period consists of two stages.  These 
stages (i.e. steps) are the same for every trading period.  In stage 1 the input suppliers 
make the pricing decisions.  Thus, Seller A and Seller B both had to choose a price for 
their respective product between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one hundredth increments (i.e. 
1.92, 0.82, and 1.25), the price extremes for the dominate land buyer case.  Note, in this 
and the two remaining treatments, Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price while 
 
 89  
making pricing decisions and Seller B does not observe Seller A’s price while making 
pricing decisions.  Subjects were provided with a payoff table to refer to while making 
pricing decisions (Table 1 in Appendix B).  Notice in Table 1 that for any given price 
combination, within each cell, the payoff Seller A receives is the top left number, the 
payoff Seller B receives is the top right number and the payoff Buyer C would earn is the 
bottom middle number.  In stage two, payoffs were received by Seller A, Seller B and 
Buyer C. 
Treatment 2: Decoupled Payment System (FS) 
The second treatment, the decoupled lump-sum payment, allows for a comparison 
in the change of production decisions within the sector, against the baseline treatment.   
In this section, I provide a very brief overview of the instructions.  The full set of 
instructions and payoff tables are provided in Appendix B.  
Subjects were provided with a payoff table to refer to while making pricing 
decisions (Table 2 in Appendix B).  Notice in Table 2 that for any given price 
combination, within each cell, the payoff Seller A receives is the top left number, the 
payoff Seller B receives is the top right number and the payoff Buyer C would earn is the 
bottom middle number.  The product A and B sellers’ payoffs remain the same as in 
table 1, however, from table 1 the buyer’s payoff has increased by 84 tokens.   
Treatment 3 Coupled Input Subsidy (CS  
The third is treatment designed to capture the changes in production decisions 
resulting from the introduction of a coupled subsidy policy tied to the acres of land.  In 
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this section, I provide a very brief overview of the instructions.  The full set of 
instructions and payoff tables are provided in Appendix B. 
In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different 
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).  In stage 1 the input suppliers make the pricing 
decisions and must choose a price for their respective product between 0 and 2.51 tokens, 
in one hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25), the price extremes for the 
dominate land buyer case.  Subjects were provided with a payoff table to refer to while 
making pricing decisions (Table 3 in Appendix B).  Notice in Table 3 that for any given 
price combination, within each cell, the payoff Seller A receives is the top left number, 
the payoff Seller B receives is the top right number and the payoff Buyer C would earn is 
the bottom middle number.  These are greater than the payoffs in treatment 1 for buyers 
and sellers alike.  
Computer Program: Z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic 
Experiments) 
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for 
Readymade Economic Experiments) (Fischbacher, 2007), to make the experiment clearer 
and more accessible for participants.  A key benefit of Z-Tree is the experimenter’s 
ability to link computers over a network allowing for easy generation and collection of 
data.  
For the stage 1 pricing decisions, each Seller viewed the following screen on their 
computer when making pricing decisions (figure 31).  Sellers A and B enter their price in 
the box located in the middle of the computer screen.  Once Sellers are confident with 
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their pricing decisions, they submit their choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the 
lower right hand corner of the computer screen.  
 
Figure 31 Z-tree Pricing Decision Input Screen For Product A and Product B Sellers 
 
While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer is presented with a 
blank waiting screen.  However, once both Sellers have input their pricing decisions, 
Buyer C will ‘click’ the grey OK button, and the experiment continues to stage 2. 
In stage 2 the payoffs of all three players in a trading group are provided.  All 
participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) viewed the following summary 
screen on their computer (Figure 32).  The trading round’s summary consists of the prices 
chosen by both Sellers (A and B) and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller 
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A, Seller B, and Buyer C).  Each player’s own payoffs is denoted as “Your Profit” on the 
summary screen.  In addition, in addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of “Your 
Profit” is displayed at the bottom of the screen. 
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Conducting the Experiment 
The Mississippi State University Institutional Review Board approved the 
experimental study on subsidy incidence (IRB # 14-128) on April 14, 2014, for research 
on using human subjects (See Appendix D).12 
Subjects were recruited in person from the department of agricultural economics, 
and by email from the departments of forestry, engineering, math and business.  All 
subjects were required to be at least a junior standing for undergraduates or of graduate 
standing.  The recruitment technique followed Davis and Holts’ (1993) suggested 
protocol.  All participants, whether it was by email or in person, were presented with the 
same information, and language was generic as not to bias the results of the experiments 
by detailing pertinent information.  Because the experiment required exactly 18 people to 
work, 18 subjects plus two to four alternatives were recruited for each session.   
I will continue this section with a brief outline of the participation procedures 
used to conduct the experiment.  This will be followed by the payment procedures of the 
sessions. 
Laboratory Market Procedures  
Upon arrival, subjects were asked to voluntarily sit at one of eighteen available 
computers.  At the computer terminal, subjects found the consent form, instructions, and 
other materials needed to complete the experiment.  Subjects were asked to read and, if 
accepting the terms, sign the consent form.  Once all consent forms had been signed and 
collected by experimenters, the market experiment was ready to begin. 
                                                 
12 The IRB in appendix D incudes the IRB application, stamped informed consent, sample payments form, 
and sample recruitment announcement.  
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For the market experiment subjects were informed they would be participating in 
a market in which they were randomly selected to act as a Buyer or Seller of products A 
or B.  The computer terminal choice made by the subject, determined the unique 
identifier (i.e. 1A-6A, 1B-6B, and 1C-6C) assigned for the data collection program.  The 
experimenter read the instructions aloud and answered questions as necessary.  Subjects 
were then directed to their computer screens to participate in the three practice trading 
rounds.   
After completion of the practice rounds, subjects were then reminded that the 
program will automatically transition to the 20 binding trading rounds, and calculate their 
earnings for each round.  At the completion of the market experiment, total earnings are 
calculated for each subject (See Payment Procedure Section below for further detail). 
Although not addressed in the scope of this thesis, subjects, upon completion of 
the market experiment, were also asked to participate in a Holt and Laury (2002) risk 
assessment game (See Appendix B).  Subjects were instructed to locate and read along as 
the experimenter reads the instructions aloud.  Subjects were then instructed to open the 
“Risk” tab in the provided Excel document.  Once all subjects had made all 10-decision 
row choices, the experimenter would let one of the subjects draw two balls.  The first ball 
determined the decision row (1-10), and the second the probability of a higher payoff (A 
or B).  Each participant recorded the first ball number, the second ball number, and then 
their decision for that row (A or B), and their earned payoff on the risk record sheet.  
Total earning were then calculated for each subject.  After payments were made, 
in the form of cash, the session was completed.  
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Payment Procedures  
The earning of the subjects were based upon their earnings from the market 
experiment and the risk experiment.  In the market experiment, earnings were in the form 
of tokens based upon the decisions made by each subject and those made by the others in 
the group.  At the end of the experiment, the number of tokens earned by each subject 
was converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate.  In the risk experiment, each 
subject’s earnings depended only upon his choice and a series of random draws, and 
possible earnings were in dollar increments.  Thus, each subject’s total earnings for the 
experiment were the summation of earnings from the market and risk experiment, plus a 
$5.00 show-up fee.  
The market experiment earning, denoted as tokens, were converted to dollars as 
follow.  The total number of trading rounds (20) was multiplied by the predicted 
equilibrium profit for each player type per round, to find the predicted equilibrium of the 
market experiment.  The market experiment predicted earnings for each player type over 
the three treatments are summarized in table 10. 
Table 10 Predicted Equilibrium Total Market Earrings  
 Total Tokens  
Player Type   Treatment 1 (NSE) Treatment 2(FSE) Treatment 3 (CSE) 
Product A Seller  1780.6 1780.6 2799 
Product B Seller  1780.6 1780.6 2765.8 
Product Buyer C 894.8 2574.8 1400.8 
 
It was estimated that the payoff from the market experiment earnings would be 
approximately 20 dollars per subject if all players act in accordance to predicted 
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equilibrium strategies.  Thus, the total tokens in table 10 are used to develop conversion 
rates for each player type per each treatment to equate experimental earnings.  To do this 
I divided the budgeted amount of 20 dollars by the total projected earnings.  The resulting 
conversion rates are presented in table 11. 
Table 11 Tokens to Dollars Conversion Rates (Tokens to Dollars) 
 Conversion Rates   
Player Type   Treatment 1 (NSE) Treatment 2(FSE) Treatment 3 (CSE) 
Product A Seller  0.011232 0.011232 0.007145 
Product B Seller  0.011232 0.011232 0.007231 
Product Buyer C 0.022351 0.007768 0.014278 
 
Thus, for experimental payment of the market experiment, each subject’s total 





In testing the theoretical predictions against the experimental results, I find that 
the prices and profits deviate from theory.  Furthermore, on average, prices are greater 
than the predicted theoretical values, thus the profits are on average less than the 
predicted values.  However, the treatment effect for prices and profits follow closely with 
the predictions of theory.  Importantly, neither of these results greatly influenced the 
predicted welfare distributions, given the outcomes of the average pricing strategies 
engaged by Sellers A and Sellers B.  
First, the results of the hypotheses relating to the theoretical predictions of prices, 
payoffs and welfare distributions for the NSE, FSE and CSE are reported.  The statistical 
test are reported first and then are followed by a graphical summary for all 20 trading 
rounds.  This will be followed by hypotheses concerning the differences of prices, profits 
and welfare across the alternative subsidy polies (i.e. the treatment effect).  Again, I 
provide first the statistical test results which are then followed by a graphical summary 
for all 20 trading rounds.  This chapter concludes with a summary and overview of the 
theoretical results across all three treatments.  
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Results of Testing Theoretical Predictions  
In this section, I report the results from prices, payoffs and welfare across all 
three-subsidy policies using t-statistics and graphical analysis.  The single sample t-test 
method will be used to compare experimental sample mean of the variable with the 
theoretical prediction.   
Price Results  
No Subsidy Price Results  
Table 12 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the price of land and seed, 
and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 33.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the price of land equaling 1.33 (predicted equilibrium price) is 
smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean price of land is statistically different 
from 1.33.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the price of land is 
statistically greater than 1.33 at the same confidence level. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value 
for the price of seed equaling 1.33 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean 
price of seed is statistically different from 1.33.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I 
find that the price of seed is statistically greater than 1.33 at the same confidence level.  
Although, the sample prices of land and seed are statistically greater than predicted from 
theory, using the paired t-test I find that the mean difference between the price of land 





Table 12 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Price For No Subsidy Policy  







Price of Land  120 1.5179 0.0216 0.2367 1.4751 1.5607 
Price of Seed  120 1.4548 0.0277 0.3033 1.3999 1.5096 
One Sample T-
test  
t-stat Ho:  Pr (T<t) Pr(lTl>ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Price of Land  8.6975 1.33 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reject 
Price of Seed 4.5053 1.33 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reject 
 
 
Figure 33 NS Price of Land and Price of Seed across 20 Trading Rounds vs The 
Predicted NSE Prices.  
Note: As seen in figure 33, experimental results differ from theory as theory did not 
predict a deviation from the equilibrium prices over the 20 trading rounds.  
Fixed Subsidy Policy Price Results 
Table 13 reports the results of the one-sample t-test for the price of land and seed, 
followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 34.  The two-tailed t-
 
100 
test’s p-value for the price of land equaling 1.33 (FSE) is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I 
conclude that the mean price of land is statistically different from 1.33.  Furthermore, 
from the one-tailed t-test I find that the price of land is statistically greater than 1.33.  The 
two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the price of seed equaling 1.33 is smaller than alpha=.05, 
thus I conclude that the mean price of seed is statistically different from 1.33. 
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the price of seed is statistically greater 
than 1.33 at the same confidence level.  As in the no subsidy results, the sample prices of 
land and seed are statistically greater than predicted from theory.  However, using the 
paired t-test I find that the mean difference between the price of land and seed is 
statistically different from zero.  This result is not in accordance to theoretical 
predictions.   
Table 13 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Price for the Fixed Subsidy Policy   







Price of Land 120 1.496 0.0265 0.2902 1.4435 1.5485 
Price of Seed 120 1.5352 0.0259 0.2842 1.4838 1.5865 
One Sample T-
test  
t-stat Ho: Pr (T<t) Pr(lTl>ltl) Pr (T>t) Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Price of Land 6.2651 1.33 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reject 





Figure 34 FS Price of Land and Price of Seed Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The 
Predicted FSE Prices.   
Note: Figure 34 summarizes the high pricing strategies chosen by the input suppliers, and 
a general movement away from the FSE price.  
Coupled Subsidy Price Results  
Table 14 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the price of land and seed, 
and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 35.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the price of land equaling 1.66 (predicted CSE) is smaller than 
alpha=.05.  Additionally, using the one-tailed t-test I find that the price of land is 
statistically greater than 1.66 at the same confidence level.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value 
for the price of seed equaling 1.66 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the 
mean price of seed is statistically different from 1.66.  Additionally, using the one-tailed 
t-test I find that the price of seed is statistically greater than 1.66 at the same confidence 
level.  As in the two prior treatments, the sample prices of land and seed are statistically 
greater than predicted from theory.  Furthermore, using the paired t-test I find that the 
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mean difference between the price of land and seed is statistically different from zero.  
This result is not in accordance to theoretical predictions.  
Table 14 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Price for the Coupled Subsidy 
Policy  







Price of Land  120 1.7836 
0.0458 0.5012 1.6929 1.8742 
Price of Seed  120 1.8718 0.0361 0.3959 1.8002 1.9433 
One Sample T-
test  
t-stat Ho:  Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Price of Land  2.7012 1.66 0.9960 0.0079 0.0040 Reject 
Price of Seed 5.8590 1.66 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reject 
 
 
Figure 35 CS Price of Land and Price of Seed Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The 
Predicted CSE Prices  
Note: Figure 35, shows the sporadic pricing of the land owner, and the general tendency 
of the seed firm increasing prices over the 20 trading rounds.  
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Profits (Payoffs) Results 
 No Subsidy Payoff Results  
Table 15 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the payoff of land and seed, 
and this is followed by a graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 36.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the landowner equaling 89.03 is smaller than 
alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically different 
from the theoretical prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the 
payoff earned by the landowner is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence 
level. The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s profit equaling 89.03 is smaller 
than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically 
different from theory’s prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the 
payoff earned by the seed supplier is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence 
level.  Using the paired t-test, I conclude that the mean difference between profit of the 
landowner and seed firm is statistically different from zero, which is not in accordance to 
theory.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the famer equaling 44.74 is 
smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of the famer is statistically 
different from the theoretical prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that 





Table 15 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs for the No Subsidy Policy    







Payoff to Land  120 75.293 
2.2258 24.3823 70.8857 79.7002 
Payoff to Seed  120 70.3023 1.7934 19.6453 66.7512 73.8533 
Payoff to Farmer  120 29.9357 1.7882 19.5892 26.3948 33.4766 
One Sample T-
test t-stat Ho: Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) 
Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Payoff Land   -6.1763 89.04 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Payoff Seed  -10.4484 89.04 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Payoff Farmer  -8.2787 44.74 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
 
 
Figure 36 NS Sector Payoffs (Landowner, Seed Firm and Farmer)Across 20 Trading 
Rounds vs The Predicted CSE Payoffs 
Note: Figure 36 shows that average profits are below the equilibrium levels; this has a 
direct correlation with the high pricing strategies in figure 33.  
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Fixed Subsidy Payoff Results  
Table 16 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the payoffs of the sector and 
it is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 37.  The two-tailed 
t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the landowner equaling 89.03 is smaller than alpha=.05, 
thus I conclude that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically different from the 
theoretical predictions.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned 
by the landowner is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence level.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s profit equaling 89.03 is smaller than alpha=.05, 
thus I conclude that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically different from theory’s 
prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by the seed 
firm is statistically less than 89.03 at the same confidence level.  Using the paired t-test I 
conclude that the mean difference between profit of the landowner and seed firm is not 
statistically different from zero, which is in accordance to theory.  The two-tailed t-test’s 
p-value for the payoff to the famer equaling 128.74 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I 
conclude that the mean profit of the famer is statistically different from the theoretical 
prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by the 




Table 16 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs for the Fixed Subsidy 
Policy  







Payoff to Land  120 68.058 2.1298 23.3305 63.8486 72.2829 
Payoff to Seed  120 70.1051 2.1895 23.9845 65.7697 74.4405 
Payoff to Farmer  120 111.7979 1.9787 21.6757 107.88 115.716 
One Sample T-test t-stat Ho: Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) 
Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Payoff Land   -9.8481 89.04 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Payoff Seed  -8.6481 89.04 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 





Figure 37 FS Sector Payoffs (Landowner, Seed Firm and Farmer)Across 20 Trading 
Rounds vs The Predicted FSE Payoffs 




Coupled Subsidy Payoff Results 
Table 17 reports the results of one-sample t-tests for the price of land and seed, 
and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 38.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the landowner equaling 139.89 is smaller than 
alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically different from 
the theoretical prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff 
earned by the landowner is statistically less than 139.79 at the same confidence level.  
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s profit equaling 138.02 is smaller than 
alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically different from 
theory’s prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by 
the seed firm is statistically less than 138.02 at the same confidence level.  Using the 
paired t-test I conclude that the mean difference between profit of the landowner and seed 
firm is not statistically different from zero (although not strongly as p-value is 0.07), 
which is in accordance to theory.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff to the 
famer equaling 70.69 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean profit of 
the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.  Furthermore, from a 
one-tailed t-test I find that the payoff earned by the landowner is statistically less than 




Table 17 Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Coupled Subsidy Payoffs  
















Farmer  120 54.7054 
4.1681 45.6589 46.4523 62.9587 
One Sample 
T-test t-stat Ho: Pr (T<t) 








Payoff Land   -8.3483 139.89 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Payoff Seed  -4.5199 89.04 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Payoff Farmer  -3.8350 70.69 0.0001 0.0002 0.9999 Reject 
 
 
Figure 38 CS Sector Payoffs (Landowner, Seed Firm and Farmer)Across 20 Trading 
Rounds vs The Predicted CSE Payoffs 
Note: The sporadic payoffs in the CS treatment are due to the large changes in the 
landowners pricing strategies over the 20 trading round.  As seen in figure 38 the seed 
firm and famer benefit from the landowner at times pricing below the optimal CSE price.    
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Welfare Distribution Results  
No Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results  
Table 18 reports the results of one-sample test for the sector in regards to percent 
of sector surplus when no subsidy is present.  The table is followed by the graphical 
summary of sector surplus distribution across all 20 rounds in figure 39.  The two-tailed 
t-test’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus equaling 0.40, or forty 
percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I determine that the mean percent of sector 
surplus held by the landowner is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.  
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by the landowner is 
statistically greater than forty percent of the total sector surplus at the same confidence 
level.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s  percent of sector surplus 
equaling 0.40, or forty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I determine that the mean 
percent of sector surplus held by the seed firm is statistically different from the 
theoretical prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by 
the seed firm is statistically greater than forty percent of the total sector surplus at the 
same confidence level, as was the same case for the landowner.  Thus, the test leads to 
rejection of the theoretical hypothesis since both the landowner and seed firm, through 
setting higher prices, retain a greater share of the sector surplus.  However, it is important 
to note that this increase in share over the hypothesized value does not imply a greater 
surplus as the landowner and seed firms both realized reduced profits from their high 
pricing strategy.  
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus equaling 
0.20, or twenty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I conclude that the mean percent 
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of sector surplus held by the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.  
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by the landowner is 
statistically less than twenty percent of the total sector surplus at the same confidence 
level.  This leads to rejection of the theoretical prediction; however, it follows with 
theory, as theory predicts a reduction in the farmer’s retention of sector surplus when the 
input suppliers implement a high pricing strategy.   
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Table 18 Summary Statistics and T-test Results for No Subsidy Welfare Distributions  









Surplus: Land   
120 0.4344 0.0051 0.0558 0.4243 0.4445 
Percent of 
Sector 
Surplus: Seed  





120 0.1508 0.0057 0.0624 0.1395 0.1621 
One Sample 
T-test t-stat Ho: Pr (T<t) 










Surplus: Land   
6.67459 0.4 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reject 
Percent of 
Sector 
Surplus: Seed  










Figure 39 NSE Sector Welfare Distributions (Landowner, Seed Firm and 
Farmer)Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The Predicted NSE Sector Welfare 
Distributions  
 
Fixed Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results  
Table 19 reports the results of one-sample test for the sector in regards to percent 
of sector surplus when a fixed subsidy of 84 tokens is paid to the farmer.  This is 
followed by the graphical summary of sector surplus distribution across all 20 rounds in 
figure 40.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus 
equaling 0.29, or twenty-nine percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean 
percent of sector surplus held by the landowner is statistically different from the 
theoretical  prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held 
by the landowner is statistically smaller than twenty-nine percent of the total sector 
surplus at the same confidence level.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s  
percent of sector surplus equaling 0.29, or twenty-nine percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, 
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thus I conclude that the mean percent of sector surplus held by the seed firm is 
statistically different from the theoretical prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-
test I find that the surplus held by the seed firm, like the landowner, is statistically less 
than twenty-nine percent of the total sector surplus at the same confidence level.  Thus, 
the test lead to rejection of the theoretical hypothesis since both the landowner and seed 
firm, through setting higher prices obtain a smaller share of the sector surplus, when a fix 
subsidy is paid to the farmer.  
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus equaling 
0.42 or forty-two percent is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean percent of 
sector surplus held by the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction.  
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the surplus held by the famer is 
statistically greater than forty-two percent of the total sector surplus at the same 
confidence level.  This leads to rejection of the theoretical predictions of the sectors 




Table 19 Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Fixed Subsidy Welfare 
Distributions  
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Figure 40 FSE Sector Welfare Distributions (Landowner, Seed Firm and 
Farmer)Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The Predicted FSE Sector Welfare 
Distributions    
 
Coupled Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results  
Table 21 reports the results of one-sample test for the sector in regards to percent 
of sector surplus and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 
41.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus equaling 
0.40 or, forty percent, is greater than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean percent of 
sector surplus held by the landowner is not statistically different from the theoretical 
prediction.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s  percent of sector surplus 
equaling 0.40, or forty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I find that the mean 
percent of sector surplus held by the seed firm is statistically different from the 
theoretical prediction.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the seed firm’s 
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percent of sector surplus is statistically greater than forty percent at the same confidence 
level.  Thus, the tests lead to rejection of the theoretical hypothesis for the seed firm, 
which is a result of the seed firm employing a higher pricing strategy than the landowner 
does, on average; because pricing strategies thus prices determine the profits and 
therefore perfect of sector surplus retention.   
The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus equaling 
0.20, or twenty percent, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus I observe that the mean percent of 
sector surplus held by the famer is statistically different from the theoretical prediction. 
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus held by 
the famer is statistically less than twenty percent, at the same confidence level.  This 
leads to rejection of the theoretical prediction, however, follows with theory as the model 
predicts a reduction in the farmer’s retention of sector surplus when the input suppliers 
engage in a high pricing strategy.   
Thus, the experimental results lead to rejection of two theoretical predictions, as 
when a coupled subsidy tied to the amount of land is introduced into the market the 
percent of sector surplus retained by the famer and seed firm were statically different 
from the predicted values due to the landowner and seed firm both pricing over the 
predicted equilibrium prices.  However, because the seed firm engaged on average in a 
higher pricing strategy than the landowner, he was able to extract more of the sector 
surplus, which resulted in the landowners share of sector surplus not being statistically 
different from the predicted value.   
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Table 20 Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Fixed Subsidy Welfare 
Distributions Summary Statistics and T-test Results for Coupled Subsidy 
Payoffs  


















120 0.1619 0.0078 0.0853 0.1465 0.1773 
One Sample T-
test t-stat Ho: Pr (T<t) 
























Figure 41 CSE Sector Welfare Distributions (Landowner, Seed Firm and 
Farmer)Across 20 Trading Rounds vs The Predicted CSE Sector Welfare 
Distributions    
 
Results of Comparing Alternative Subsidy Polices  
To ensure the correct t-test statistic is calculated, the assumption of equal variance 
must be tested.  Bartlett’s chi-squared test static is used to accept or reject the null of 
equal variance at 99 percent confidence level.  Rejection of the null indicates a violation 
of the assumption.  Accordingly, an adjusted t-statistic using the individual sample 
standards deviations versus the pooled standard deviation will be found using the Welch 
procedure (1974).  
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Price Results   
No Subsidy vs Fixed Subsidy Price Results  
Table 21 reports the results of two-sample test for the price of land and seed, and 
is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 42.  The price of land 
does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 2 (FS), thus the 
alterative Welch’s t-statistic are reported.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the mean 
price of land having no difference across treatment 1 and 2 is larger than alpha=.05, thus 
accepting the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly different 
from zero.  Thus, I conclude that the mean price of land in the fixed subsidy case does not 
differ from the no subsidy case, as predicted from theory.   
The price of seed has equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 2 
(FS); therefore, I report the standard t-statistic.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the 
price of seed having no difference across treatment 1 and 2 is smaller than alpha=.05, 
thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly 
different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean price of 
land is statistically greater than in the fixed subsidy than the mean price of seed in the no 
subsidy case.  This is a result not predicted from theory.  
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Table 21 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Prices in the No Subsidy vs. Fixed 
Subsidy Policy   







Price of Land        
Combine   240 1.507 0.0171 0.2645 1.4733 1.5406 
Difference+  0.0219 0.0342  -0.0454 0.08928 
Price of Seed        
Combine  240 1.495 0.0191 0.2961 1.4573 1.5326 
Difference+   -0.0804 0.0379  -0.1552 -0.0057 
One Sample T-
test  
t-stat  Ho:  Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Price of Land  0.6410* Diff=0 0.7389 0.5221 0.2611 Accept 
Price of Seed -2.1191 Diff=0 0.0176 0.0351 0.9824 Reject 
Note:+difference refers to the difference between the mean price in treatment 1 minus 
mean price in treatment 2 and * indicates use of welch t-stat 
 
 
Figure 42 Treatment Effect on Land and Seed Prices Across 20 Trading Rounds 




No Subsidy vs Coupled Subsidy Price Results  
Table 22 reports the results of two-sample t-test for the price of land and price of 
seed, and is followed by the graphical summary across all 20 rounds in figure 43.  The 
price of land does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 3 (CS), 
thus the alternative Welch’s t-statistic will be used.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the 
price of land having no difference across treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05, 
thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly 
different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean price of 
land with the addition of the coupled subsidy is statistically greater than the mean price 
without the coupled subsidy.  Thus, the coupled subsidy will on average increase the 
price of land, all else constant; this is a result that is predicted by theory.   
The price of seed does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and 
treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be used.  The two-tailed t-
test’s p-value for the price of seed having no difference across treatment 1 and 3 is 
smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find 
that the mean price of seed with the addition of the coupled subsidy policy is statistically 
greater than the mean price of seed with no subsidy policy, at the same confidence level.  
Thus, a coupled subsidy will, on average, increase the price of seed, all else constant; this 
is a result predicted from theory.   
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Table 22 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Prices in the No Subsidy vs. 
Coupled Subsidy Policy   







Price of Land    
    
Combine   240 1.6508 0.02667 0.4131 1.5982 1.7034 
Difference+   -0.2657 0.0506  -0.3655 -0.1658 
Price of Seed        
Combine  240 1.663 0.0264 0.4093 1.6112 1.7153 
Difference+   -0.417 0.0455  -0.5067 -0.3273 
One Sample T-
test  
t-stat  Ho:  Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Price of Land  -5.2506* Diff=0 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Price of Seed -9.1590* Diff=0 0.000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject  
Note: +difference refers to the difference between the mean price in treatment 1 minus 
mean price in treatment 3 and * indicates use of welch t-stat 
 
 
Figure 43 Treatment Effect on Land and Seed Prices Across 20 Trading Rounds 




Profits (Payoffs) Results  
No Subsidy VS. Fixed Subsidy Payoff Results  
Table 23 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the 
landowner and seed firm and the farmer.  It is followed by a graphical summary across all 
20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 44 and for the farmer in figure 45. 
The payoff to the landowner does have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) 
and treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported.  The two-tailed t-test’s 
p-value for the payoff earned by the landowner, having no difference across treatment 1 
and 2, is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find 
that the mean earning of the landowner in the fixed subsidy case is statistically less than 
the mean earnings from the no subsidy case, at the same confidence level.  However, this 
finding is the result of the spillover effect induced from the seed firms, on average 
employing a higher pricing strategy in treatment 2.  Thus, this result is not predicted by 
theory.    
The payoff to the seed firm does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) 
and treatment 2 (FS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the seed firm, having no difference across 
treatment 1 and 2, is greater than alpha=.05, thus accepting the null that the difference in 
means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-
tailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the seed firm in the fixed subsidy case is 
neither statistically greater than nor less than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.  
This finding is interesting since the mean price chosen by the seed firm was higher in 
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treatment 2; however, on average it did not statistically alter the mean payoffs earned.  
This result is due to the slight change in the average pricing strategy of the landowner. 
The payoff to the farmer has equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) and 
treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-
value for the payoff earned by the farmer, firm having no difference across treatment 1 
and 2, is greater than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find 
that the mean earning of the farmer in the fixed subsidy case is statistically greater than 
the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.  This is a result that was predicted from 
theory.    
The addition of the fixed payment was not theoretically predicted to alter the 
payoffs to the input suppliers; however, the results indicate the landowners mean NSE 
profits where greater than the mean FSE profits.  Just as the theoretical predictions 
suggest, the fixed lump sum payment of 84 tokens statistically increased farmer profits in 
relation to a market with no subsidy, although still falling short of the theoretical 
prediction of the profit.  
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Table 23 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs in the No Subsidy vs. 
Fixed Subsidy Policy   







Payoff of Land        
Combine   240 71.6794 1.5547 24.086 68.6166 74.7421 
Difference+   7.2271 3.0806  1.1584 13.2959 
Payoff of Seed        
Combine  240 70.2037 1.4121 21.8769 67.4218 72.9855 
Difference+   0.1972 2.8302  -5.3791 5.7735 
Payoff  of 
Farmer        
Combine  240 70.8668 2.9632 45.9060 65.0294 76.7042 
Difference+   -81.862# 2.6670  -87.1162 -76.6082 
One Sample T-
test  
t-stat  Ho:  Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > 
ltl ) 




Payoff of Land  2.3460 Diff=0 0.9901 0.0198 0.0099 Reject 
Payoff of Seed -






0 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Notes: +difference refers to the difference between the mean payoffs in treatment 1 minus 
mean payoff in treatment 2.  #This is the difference of the mean payoff in treatment 1 and 
treatment 2, thus creating a discrepancy between the 84 paid by the subsidy and the 




Figure 44 Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds 
Comparing NS and FS 
 
 
Figure 45 Treatment Effect on Farmer Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds Comparing 
NS and FS 
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No Subsidy VS Coupled Subsidy Payoff Results 
Table 24 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the 
landowner and seed firm and the farmer.  It is followed by the graphical summary across 
all 20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 46 and for the farmer in figure 47.     
The payoff to the landowner does not have equal variances across treatment 1 
(NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported.  The 
two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the landowner having no difference 
across treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the 
difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, 
from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the landowner in the coupled 
subsidy case is statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case, at 
the same confidence level.  This is a result that was predicted by theory    
The payoff to the seed firm does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) 
and treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the seed firm having no difference across 
treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in 
means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-
tailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the seed firm in the coupled subsidy case is 
statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case, at the same 
confidence level.  This result is predicted from theory.  
The payoff to the farmer does not have equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) 
and treatment 3 (CS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be reported.  The two-
tailed t-test’s p-value for the payoff earned by the famer having no difference across 
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treatment 1 and 3 is less than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in 
means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-
tailed t-test I find that the mean earning of the farmer, with the addition of the coupled 
subsidy is statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.   
The results are in accordance to theoretical predictions, as the coupled subsidy of 
one token tied to the quantity choice of land, raised the mean profits earned by the input 
suppliers; as the mean profits are statistically greater than the means in the no subsidy 
from treatment 1.  Likewise, the subsidy also increased the mean profit of the farmer 
because the mean coupled subsidy profit from treatment 3 is increased over the no 
subsidy profits realized in treatment 1.  However, a result not predicted from theory is the 
difference between the payoffs of the landowner and the seed firm.  The two-tailed t-test 
for the mean difference of the differences between profit of the landowner and seed firm 
across treatments 1 and 3 is statistically different from zero as the p-value of 0.0325 leads 
to rejection of the null.  Thus, the coupled subsidy, on average, increased the profits (i.e. 
increased the difference over the no subsidy case) for the seed firm more so than for the 
landowner.  In all, the experimental results on average indicate that the addition of the 
coupled input subsidy will statistically increase the profits of the entire sector if the inputs 
are nearly perfect complements, as theoretically predicted.  
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Table 24 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Payoffs in the No Subsidy vs. 
Coupled Subsidy Policy   







Payoff of Land    
    
Combine   240 91.9951 2.2258 24.3823 70.8857 79.7002 
Difference +   -33.4043 4.3491  -41.9816 -24.827 
Payoff of Seed        
Combine  240 94.3171 2.9033 44.9780 88.5978 100.0364 
Difference +  -48.0296 4.9159  -57.7403 -38.319 
Payoff  of Farmer        
Combine  240 42.3206 2.4006 37.19 37.5916 47.0496 
Difference +  -24.7697 4.5355  -33.726 -15.8135 
One Sample T-
test  
t-stat  Ho:  Pr (T<t) Pr( lTl > ltl ) Pr (T>t) Accept or 
Reject Ho 
Payoff of Land  -7.6807* Diff=0 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject 
Payoff of Seed -9.7703* Diff=0 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject  
Payoff of Farmer  -5.4613* Differ=0 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject  
Notes: +difference refers to the difference between the mean payoffs in treatment 1 
minus mean payoff in treatment 3 and * indicates use of welch t-stat  
 
Figure 46 Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds 




Figure 47 Treatment Effect on Farmer Profits Across 20 Trading Rounds Comparing 
NS and CS 
 
Welfare Distribution Results  
No Subsidy Vs Fixed Subsidy Welfare Distribution Results  
Table 25 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the 
landowner and seed firm and the farmer.  It is followed by the graphical summary across 
all 20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 48 and for the farmer in figure 49. 
The landowner’s percent of sector surplus has equal variances across treatment 1 
(NS) and treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported.  The two-tailed t-
test’s p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus having no difference across 
treatment 1 and 2 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in 
means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-
tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the landowner in the 
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fixed subsidy case is statistically less than the mean percent of sector surplus from the no 
subsidy case.  This is a result predicted by theory.     
The seed firm’s percent of sector surplus does not have equal variances across 
treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 2 (FS), thus the alterative Welch’s t-statistic will be 
reported.  The two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the seed firm’s percent of sector surplus 
having no difference across treatment 1 and 2  is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting 
the null that the difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  
Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus 
retained by the seed firm in the fixed subsidy case is statistically less than the mean 
percentage of sector surplus earned by the seed firm in the no subsidy case.  This is a 
result predicted by theory.   
The famer’s percent of sector surplus has equal variances across treatment 1 (NS) 
and treatment 2 (FS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported.  The two-tailed t-test’s 
p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus having no difference across treatment 1 
and 2 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the difference in means is not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, from a one-tailed t-test I find 
that the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the famer in the fixed subsidy case is 
statistically greater than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.  This is a result 
predicted from theory.     
In accordance to theoretical predictions, the fixed subsidy of 84 token increased 
the farmer’s percent of total available sector surplus while decreasing the input supplier’s 
share.  In all, the experimental results conclude that the addition of a fixed subsidy will 
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statistically alter the distribution of sector surplus as predicted by theory, thus confirming 




Table 25 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Welfare Distributions in the No 
Subsidy vs. Fixed Subsidy Policy   









Landowner     
    
Combine   240 0.3505 0.0064 0.0991 0.3379 0.3631 





    
Combine  240 0.3446 0.0060 0.0936 0.3327 0.3565 





    
Combine  240 0.3049 0.0108 0.1676 0.2836 0.3262 
Difference +   -0.3082 0.0084  -0.3248 -0.2916 
One Sample T-
test  










Landowner   




17.612* Diff=0 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Reject  
Percent of 
Sector Surplus: 
Farmer   
-36.625 Diff=0 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 Reject  
Notes: +difference refers to the difference between the mean percent of sector surplus in 




Figure 48 Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Welfare Distributions Across 20 
Trading Rounds Comparing NS and FS 
 
 
Figure 49 Treatment Effect on Farmer Welfare Distributions Across 20 Trading 




Welfare Results Three and Four  
Table 26 reports the results of a two-sample test for the payoffs earned by the 
landowner and seed firm and the farmer.  It is followed by the graphical summary across 
all 20 rounds for the input suppliers in figure 50 and for the farmer in figure 51.   
The landowner’s percent of sector surplus does not have equal variances across 
treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the adjusted Welch’s t-statistic will be 
reported.  The p-value for the landowner’s percent of sector surplus having no difference 
across treatment 1 and 3 is smaller than alpha=.05, thus rejecting the null that the 
difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, 
from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the 
landowner in the presence of a coupled input subsidy is statistically greater than the mean  
in the no subsidy case.   
The seed firm’s percent of sector surplus does have equal variances across 
treatment 1 (NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the standard t-statistic will be reported.  The 
two-tailed t-test’s p-value  for the seed firm’s percent of sector surplus having no 
difference across treatment 1 and 3 is greater than alpha=.05, thus accepting the null that 
the difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, 
from a one-tailed t-test I find that the mean percent of sector surplus retained by the seed 
firm does not change with the addition of the coupled subsidy. 
The famer’s percent of sector surplus does not have variances across treatment 1 
(NS) and treatment 3 (CS), thus the adjusted Welch’s t-statistic will be reported.  The 
two-tailed t-test’s p-value for the farmer’s percent of sector surplus having no difference 
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across treatment 1 and 3 is greater than alpha=.05, thus accepting the null that the 
difference in means is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Thus, I find that 
the mean percent of sector surplus earned by the famer in the coupled subsidy case is 
neither statistically greater nor less than the mean earnings from the no subsidy case.   
Thus, in accordance to theoretical predictions, the coupled subsidy of one token 
tied to the quantity choice of land did not alter the surplus distributions of the seed firm 
or the farmer, as there is no statistical difference in the NS results and the CS results.  
However, the landowner’s percent of sector surplus on average was not equal across 
treatments as predicted by theory.  
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Table 26 Summary Statistics and T-test Results of Welfare Distributions in the No 
Subsidy vs. Coupled Subsidy Policy   







Percent of Sector 
Surplus: 
Landowner     
    
Combine   240 0.4215 0.0053 0.0828 0.411 0.4320 
Difference +   0.026 0.0106  0.0049 0.0466 
Percent of Sector 
Surplus: Seed        
Combine  240 0.4222 0.0048 0.0746 0.4127 0.4316 
Difference +   -0.015 0.0096  -0.0336 0.0042 
Percent of Sector 
Surplus: Farmer         
Combine  240 0.1563 0.0048 0.0748 0.1468 0.1659 
Difference +   -0.0111 0.0096  -0.0301 0.008 
One Sample T-
test  








Percent of Sector 
Surplus: 
Landowner   
2.433* Diff=0 0.9920 0.0159 0.0080 Reject 
Percent of Sector 
Surplus: Seed -1.528 Diff=0 0.0639 0.1279 0.9361 Accept 
Percent of Sector 
Surplus: Farmer   -1.148* Diff=0 0.1264 0.2528 0.8736 Accept 
Note: +difference refers to the difference between the mean percent of sector surplus in 




Figure 50 Treatment Effect on Input Supplier Welfare Distributions Across 20 





Figure 51 Treatment Effect on Farmer  Welfare Distributions Across 20 Trading 
Rounds Comparing NS and CS 
 
Summary of Experimental Results  
To address the central issue of the farmers’ ability to retain subsidy dollars, I 
utilize the mean prices, payoffs and welfare distributions across the subsidy treatments to  
identify the factors contributing to the farmers’ non-retention of subsidy dollars and to 
note what degree the non-retained subsidy dollars distort market outcomes.  I finally 
address the subsidy incidence in terms of the percentage of profits.  
Overall, it is clear that, the fixed payment mechanism creates fewer market 
distortions (See tables 21, 22, 23 and 24).  First, as seen in the price results, the price of 
land decreases by only 0.02 tokens and the price of seed increases by 0.08 tokens from 
the no subsidy to fixed subsidy treatments.  Whereas, in treatment three the price of land 
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increases by 0.27 tokens and the price of seed increases by 0.42 tokens, over the no 
subsidy treatment.  
Figure 52 outlines the variation in profits for the landowner, seed firm and famer 
for the decoupled and the coupled subsidy treatments.  The graph shows that the mean 
total sector surplus for the fixed subsidy is 250 tokens, whereas the mean sector surplus 
in the coupled subsidy treatment is 282.  Thus, the mean payment of 67.507 due to the 
multiplier effect has a greater (positive) impact on the sector than the 84 dollar fixed 
payment from treatment 2.  Thus, treatment three has a higher return on the subsidy 




Figure 52 Profits Across the Fixed Subsidy Vs the Coupled Subsidy Policies in 
Comparison to Subsidy Payments  
 
However, as shown in figure 53 the change in the famer’s profit is significantly 
less in the coupled subsidy than in the fixed subsidy payment mechanism.  The results 
find that the farmer only gains, on average, 24.76 of the average coupled subsidy 
payment of 67.506.  Furthermore, the seed supplier gains the largest increase in profits 
from the coupled subsidy, as the firm benefits from an average of 48.02 additional tokens 
 
142 
under a coupled subsidy.  Surprisingly, the landowner does not fare as well as the seed 
supplier as the landowner only accrues an additional 33.0404 tokens on average.   
 






SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Summary and Conclusions 
The recent introduction of the Agricultural Act of 2014 dramatically changed the 
payment mechanism for farm subsidy payments.  However, the central issues remain the 
same—the farmers’ ability to retain subsidy dollars.  Although, in the partial equilibrium 
model I cannot measure the subsidy retained by the farmer, I use the percent of sector 
welfare retention as a proxy.  Comparing welfare distributions takes out the price and 
quantity effects, thus allowing me to compare across alterative police.  Thus, it is 
important to identify the factors contributing to the farmers’ non-retention of subsidy 
dollars and to what degree the non-retained subsidy dollars distort market outcomes. 
Summary  
Empirical research has found that farm subsidies are heavily chaptalized into land 
rental rates (Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992; Just and Miranowski, 1993;and Schmitz, 
Just, and Moss, 2003).  However, the literature suggest disparities in the market power 
assumption as having an influence on the farmers ability to retain subsidy dollars 
(Saitone, Sexton and Sexton, 2008 and Russo, Goodhue and Sexton, 2011).  The method 
I use to analyze subsidy incidence accounts for the market power of the input suppliers in 
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the agriculture sector.  Accordingly, since farmers are price takers for some inputs, I 
specify Bertrand competition for the model to address the market power in a 
heterogonous input market.  This specification is fundamental as Fulton and Giannakas 
(2001) suggest market power as having adverse distributional impacts that are relevant 
for public policy consideration, and Myers, Sexton and Tomek (2010) indicate that the 
perfect competition assumption will lead to misleading results when an oligopoly, 
oligopsony or both characterize the true institution.  
The two upstream Bertrand competitors represented in the model are selling 
complementary goods (i.e. factors of production), thus the seed manufacture competes 
with a landowner in setting prices.  The Bowley model was utilized due to the breakdown 
(i.e. pricing at marginal cost, for further detail see appendix A) of the CES model and 
more importantly it has been used extensively in modeling differentiated product in 
Bertrand and Cournot competition (e.g. Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984; Häckner 
2000; Symeonidis, 2002).  Using the Bowley functional form to model two differentiated 
input suppliers is unique with regards to the subsidy incidence, as the literature to date 
has ignored the impact(s) of horizontal competition in the upstream market.  However, 
modeling of non-substitutable (complementary) inputs exhibit unique characteristics and 
generate spillover effects (externality) within a sector.  Specifically, in price competition, 
increasing the price of one input negatively influences profits to the sellers of the 
complement inputs.  This cross-price effect generates a prisoner’s dilemma game for the 
two suppliers of the complementary inputs.    
Thus, the main contributions to the subsidy incidence literature is the 
acknowledgement of a competitive environment in which  i) factors of production in 
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agriculture are largely complementary, and ii) input suppliers in technically separate 
markets are able to compete for the extraction of the subsidy dollars paid to the farmer.  
More specifically, through the theoretical and experimental method I was able to identify 
the impacts of the competitive relationships, input substitutability, and alterative subsidy 
policies.   
The theoretical derived results, for the coupled and fixed subsidy are consistent 
with past research, in regards to the treatment effects.  For the fixed subsidy only the 
payoff to the farmer increases, thus the result is a change in the welfare distributions of 
the sector.  However, under a coupled policy theoretical input prices, input quantities, and 
profits are increased in the sector, but results in no change for the welfare distributions.  
The fixed subsidy increases the available sector surplus.  The distribution and effect of 
decoupled payments rest upon the fact that the fixed subsidy solely improves the farmer's 
sector surplus, under the assumption that G (the fixed direct payment) is a separable 
influence on the farmer's decision.  Thus, it does not distort production decisions (i.e. 
input market prices and quantities).   
Unlike the fixed subsidy, the coupled subsidy policy, in theory results in a higher 
input price for the affiliated factor, hence it is one of the contributing factors to the 
subsidy incidence.  However, the non-affiliated input markets (seed) capture the subsidy 
dollar to a lesser degree as technical substitution of inputs rises although the subsidy 
incidence applies to all inputs.  Otherwise stated, for every dollar the farmer receives 
from a coupled subsidy payment, the landowner and seed manufacture are 
simultaneously, through higher prices (stage 1 reaction function) and an increase in factor 
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quantities (stage 2 reaction function), able to extract a portion of the increase in available 
sector surplus.  
To gain insight into the welfare distribution impacts of the fixed and coupled 
subsidy, I use the farmer’s and input providers’ surplus in equilibrium as a percentage of 
surplus available in the market (as a given, market is in equilibrium).  The famer realizes 
the greatest improvement in surplus share under the fixed subsidy policy, more so as 
inputs become closer substitutes.  Interestingly, though the farmer’s profits increase 
under a coupled subsidy policy, the improvement in surplus distribution is modest in 
relation to no-subsidy policy.  Overall, the improvement in the farmer’s surplus 
distribution is driven by the technical relationship of the inputs and the Bertrand 
competition as the coupled subsidy does not alter the distribution.   
The distribution of total sector surplus for the input suppliers differs across the 
various subsidy policies.  For all policies, the landowner and seed firm have nearly 
symmetric surplus shares when the inputs are nearly perfect complements.  Under a fixed 
subsidy policy, input supplier surplus shares are symmetrically lower than the market 
with no-subsidy.  However, under the coupled subsidy policy, the affiliated (non-
affiliated) input supplier’s surplus distribution is greater (less) than both the no and fixed 
subsidy policy.  However, as the inputs approach nearly perfect complements, the 
coupled subsidy results in nearly symmetric surplus shares; this result is driven by the 
Bertrand competition between the input suppliers. 
However, not all of the theoretical predictions and relationships held in the 
development laboratory markets.  These results were key to providing empirical results 
for the model and testing of the theoretical predictions.  The controlled environment, set 
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up in the experimental market, allowed for isolation of factors that induced a change in 
subject behavior, and therefore market outcomes.  The experimental setting was 
necessary to understand to what extent the alternative subsidy payment mechanisms 
modify the strategic interactions in the sector and therefore the distribution of surplus 
across the sector.  The experiment consisted of three treatments; each treatment was a 
three-player game involving two input providers and a buyer.  I started with a summary 
of the landowner’s actions and results across the three treatments, then summarize the 
seed firm’s actions and results, and finally discuss the famers results across the three 
treatments.  
In the no subsidy case, the observed price of land was greater than the predicted 
value of 1.33.  Accordingly, it follows that the t-test for the landowner’s profit in the no-
subsidy treatment indicates that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically less than 
the theoretical prediction of 89.03.  However, the treatment effect across the no subsidy 
treatment and fixed subsidy treatment are in accordance to theory’s predictions since the 
mean price of land in the fixed subsidy case do not differ from mean in the no-subsidy 
case.  Thus, the observed price of land is also above the predicted value of 1.33 for the 
fixed subsidy payment policy.  Intuitively, it follows that the mean profit of the 
landowner is statistically less than the theoretical prediction of 89.03 for the fixed subsidy 
policy.  For the coupled subsidy, the observed price of land is also statistically greater 
than the predicted value.  Thus, the observed price of land is greater than theoretical 
prediction of 1.66 tokens. Although, to some degree counter-intuitive, the landowner 
would benefit by coordinating and setting prices below that of the Bertrand equilibriums 
(Dari-Matticacci and Parisi, 2006).  Additionally, in accordance to theory’s prediction, 
 
148 
the mean price of land with the coupled subsidy is statistically greater than the mean 
price without the coupled subsidy and I conclude that on average the coupled input 
subsidy will increase the price of land, all else constant.  From the pricing results of the 
landowner, it makes since that I was able to conclude that the mean profit of the 
landowner is statistically less than 139.89, the theoretical prediction in the presence of the 
coupled subsidy, but it is greater than mean profit of the landowner in the presence of no 
subsidy. 
In the no subsidy case, the observed price of seed was greater than the predicted 
value of 1.33.  Accordingly, it follows that the t-test for the landowner’s profit in the no-
subsidy treatment indicates that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically less than 
the theoretical prediction of 89.03.  However, unlike the price of land the treatment effect 
across the no subsidy treatment and fixed subsidy treatment does not follow in 
accordance to theory’s predictions since the mean price of seed in the fixed subsidy case 
differs (greater) from mean in the no-subsidy case.  Thus, the observed price of seed is 
also above the predicted value of 1.33 for the fixed subsidy payment policy.  Intuitively, 
it follows that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically less than the theoretical 
prediction of 89.03 for the fixed subsidy policy.  For the coupled subsidy, the observed 
price of seed is also statistically greater than the predicted value.  Thus, the observed 
price of seed is greater than theoretical prediction of 1.66 tokens.  Additionally, in 
accordance to theory’s prediction, the mean price of seed given the coupled subsidy is 
statistically greater than the mean price without the coupled subsidy, and I conclude that 
on average the coupled input subsidy will increase the price of seed, all else constant.  It 
is, however, interesting to note that the coupled subsidy on average increased the profits 
 
149 
(i.e. increased the difference over the no-subsidy case) for the seed firm more so than for 
the landowner.  From the pricing results of the seed supplier, it makes since that I was 
able to conclude that the mean profit of the seed firm is statistically less than 138.02, the 
theoretical prediction in the presence of the coupled subsidy, but it s greater than mean 
profit of the seed firm in the presence of no subsidy.   
In the no subsidy case, the observed price of land and seed were both was greater 
than the predicted value; thus, it follows that the t-test for the farmers’ profit in the no-
subsidy treatment indicates that the mean profit of the landowner is statistically less than 
the theoretical prediction.  However, the treatment effect across the no subsidy treatment 
and fixed subsidy treatment are in accordance to theory’s predictions since the mean 
profit of the farmer in the fixed subsidy is greater than the mean profit of the farmer in 
the no-subsidy case.  Intuitively, it follows that the mean profit of the farmer is 
statistically less than the theoretical prediction for the fixed subsidy policy.  For the 
coupled subsidy, the observed input prices are greater than the predicted values; thus, the 
observed profit of the farmer is less than the theoretical prediction of 70.69 tokens.  
Additionally, in accordance to theory’s prediction, the mean profit of the famer given the 
coupled subsidy is statistically greater than the mean profit without the coupled subsidy, 
and I conclude that on average the coupled input subsidy will increase the profits of the 
entire sector, all else constant.   
Implications For Public Policy  
The robust theoretical and experimental results indicate market power as having 
adverse distributional impacts, thus, the market power granted to biotech firms (i.e. 
Monsanto and those alike) through US patents needs to be of high concern when it comes 
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to drafting future public policy.  The distributional impacts from market power 
exponentially intensify in the presence of a coupled subsidy, due to the multiplier effect.  
Furthermore, as seen in the experimental results, the market power granted by these 
patents has an added adverse impact on the entire sector when the input supplier(s) 
engage in extremely high pricing strategies (i.e. set prices above their optimal price). 
In addressing upstream market power established through US patents, I am able to 
identify government failure not addressed in previous subsidy literature.  The additional 
government failure is due to the conflicting goals of the US Farm and US Patent policies.  
In particular, there exist unintended consequences of the US Patent laws in the presence 
of farm subsidies.  These conflicting goals induce a large subsidy incidence.  As such, the 
positive externality created by the conflicting policies allows large upstream agribusiness 
firms with patents, to benefit substantially by receiving the greatest percentage increase 
in profits.  More, concerning is the input suppliers’ percentage increase in profits are 
almost double that of the farmer’s.  This effect is exasperated when the farmer gains 
countervailing market power in one of the input markets (i.e. land rental market).  
Limitations And Suggestions For Further Research  
Up until this point I have only discussed two potential outcomes of a bilateral 
monopoly between the landowner and farmer.  I have outlined the two extreme cases of 
the dominate seller (landowner), and a dominate buyer (farmer).  However, as mentioned 
earlier, there exist a third possibility, the farmer and the landowner may negotiate non-
cooperatively or cooperate and achieve a multilateral beneficial outcome.  Nevertheless, 
the prices, quantities, and profits achieved in the two extreme cases, monopoly and 
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monopsony, provided useful baselines for analyzing bilateral negotiations between a 
farmer and landowner. 
Non- cooperative negotiation will allow the farmer to gain countervailing market 
power.  Countervailing market power defined and developed by John Kenneth Galbraith, 
summarized by him is,  
“… economic power has been mitigated –the gap filled–by countervailing power.  
Those who are subject to the aggressions of economic power—to a monopoly 
…have both a negative and a positive incentive to organize resistance...they are 
encouraged to do so by the prospect of splitting off some of the gains associated 
with the original power position.  …bargaining power… a principal reliance of 
the weak seller or the weak buyer when faced with a strong position across the 
market”. 
Where in the non-cooperative negotiation scenario, the equilibrium upper limit on 
price (1.33) comes from the dominate seller case, and the dominate buyer case, provides 
the lower limit on the rental rate of land (0).  This implies that the landowner (farmer and 
seed firm) can do no worse than the dominate buyer (seller) scenario and no better than 
the dominate seller (buyer) scenario.  I predict that the Nash bargaining outcomes on 
average would decrease the price of land, but to what degree depends upon the 
distribution of the market power in the land rental market.  All else constant, this would 
result in increased profits for the farmer and seed firm, and depending upon the reduction 
in price, it could increase or decrease the profits for the landowner.  Interestingly, 
because it is the case that the land market affects the strategic behavior and profits of the 
seed firm, as seen in the dominate buyer case, if the seed supplier accounts for the 
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countervailing market power, his optimal strategy would be to increase the price of seed.  
Thus, the seed firm is likely to receive the greatest benefits of this distribution of power 
in the land market.   
However, the ‘best outcome’ referred to as the cooperative solution would come 
only from vertical integration or collusion between farmer and landowner, such that 
vertical integration is the case when the farmer buys the land.  Or, when participants both 
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The research initially attempted to utilize the fully flexible and the well-known 
CES production function (Arrow et al, date). 13   Because two necessary inputs (land and 
seed) where to be modeled, it was evident that the Elasticity of substitution,  in addition 
to the factor share and the factor supply, would be a key determinant in concern to 
capitalization of the marginal subsidy dollar.  Accordingly, the Constant Elastically of 
Substitution (CES) production function was attempted which is frequently used to 
estimate the elasticity of substitution between factors.  However,  recognition was made 
regarding the following limitations of the CES Function.  
i. Restricts the elasticity of substitution to be same for any point along the 
isoquant and across all factors.   
ii. Inability or limited ability to for serious research when more than two 
inputs are involved.14   
However, this functional form exhibits fundamental theoretical errors and 
limitations in the presence of Bertrand market power.  Primarily, regardless of product 
differentiation, Bertrand competition results in input suppliers employing marginal cost 
pricing. 
Derivation of CES Theoretical Model 
I start with the assumption of a CES production function and use a multi-stage 
profit maximization approach to determine the Nash equilibriums.  I will first derive the 
input demand ( second stage reaction functions of the famer) for both factors of 
                                                 
13 In their work entitled “Capitalization Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency 
14 This is one of the reason only 2 factors of productions are used with the thesis.  Because to comply with 
the CES function, representative factors of production land and seed explored.  Nothing that the seed firm 
is a proxy for any large agribusiness firm that has the ability to set prices.  . 
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production.  I will follow by showing that the CES function ‘crashes (i.e. prices 
competition results in the input firms pricing at marginal cost)’ when solving for the 
Bertrand Nash equilibrium. 
The famer’s objective function is represented as  
 /
,
 [ ]p vF L SL SMAX P L S w L w S
         , (71)  
and was simplified by the following assumptions.  A the efficiency parameter that 
will be set equal to 1, for simplification.   and  are the share parameters, or the factor 
intensity for input of land (L) and the commodity seed (S), respectively, where 
1 and 1        .  To insure decreasing returns to scale15  0 1v  , where v is the 
degree of homogeneity.  Parameter   is directly related to the elasticity of substitution, 
as: 








.  The low degree of substitutability between the factors of 
production is based on inelastic demand for seed and land (Saitone, Sexton and Sexton, 
2008).  Thus it is rational to assume, thus   will lie between 0 and 1 (Debertin, 1986).  
To impose this restriction on the production function 0   and 1p v  , this will denote 
the complementary technical interdependence of the two inputs.  
Taking the First order necessary conditions with respect to the farmer’s choice 
variables, quantity of land (L) and seed (S) we obtain: 
                                                 
15 This is assumed, and is an important parameter restrictions that insures value of the marginal products is 
downward sloping.   
16 when rho is infinite the elasticity of sub. approaches that of a Leontief and a as rho approaches 0 perfect 
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The two first order conditions are simultaneously solved for L and S in terms of 
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Moving to stage two, where the seed manufacture and the landowner should be 
able to force the famer to accept a set price.  The seed manufactures (landowners) profit 
maximization problem is specified total revenue minus total cost.  The equations are 
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where C(S) and C(L) are the long run total cost functions and are assumed to be operating 
at constant marginal cost.  Thus, the cost represents the exogenous cost to the 
representative seed manufacture and landowner and assumes all cost to be fixed thus 
marginal cost is zero.  Assuming the seed manufacture seeks to maximize profit, the first 
order conditions, with respect to own price, for a maximum are given as:  
 
11 1
1 1 ( 1 )1
1
( ) ( ( 1 ) (1 ) ( ) )( ( ) )






























    
   
 (79) 
The landowner is also assumed to maximize profit, thus the first order conditions 
for a maximum with respect to own price is specified as:  
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According to the first order condition for a maximum, the firms will equate 
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Through the use of  Bertrand Model I attempted to examine the interdependence 
between rivals' decisions in terms of pricing decisions.  However, this is where the 
problem arose, as solving for the Bertrand prices.   
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Thus, the Bertrand solution is that of a perfectly competitive market (i.e. input 
price = marginal cost).  First, this is not consistent with price setting firms and secondly 
this model specifies a situation in which neither the landowner nor seed manufacture 
would be able to extract rent, more specifically the marginal subsidy dollar.  This relation 
is depicted in Figure A1, in which we can see that when the firms exist symmetric 
marginal cost, which are set to 0, prices will also be set to 0.  Thus, the seed neither 
manufacture nor land experience long run profit.    
 
Figure 54 The Bertrand Reaction Functions of the Seed Manufacture and Landowner 
 







Thus, I am not able to use the CES production function in Bertrand competition, 
price-setting firms.  And I therefore propose and move forward with the quadratic and 
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Treatment 1 Instructions  
**Instructions for Market Experiment 1** 
 
Thank you for coming!!! 
 




Today, you will be participating in a series of experiments regarding i) your decision 
making in a market setting, ii) the decisions you make in risky situations, and iii) your 
level of assertive behavior in various scenarios.   
 
In the first experiment, you will either be making price decisions as sellers that impact all 
participants earnings, or you be will be subject to the pricing decisions of sellers, hence 
the buyer.   
 
In the second experiment you will be making independent choices where the outcome of 






You have been paid a $5.00 showing-up fee.  This money is yours regardless of whether 
you complete the experiment today.  
 
Experiment 1: You earn tokens based upon the decisions you make and those made by 
others.  At the end of the experiment today, the number of tokens you earn will be 
converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate.   
 
Experiment 2: Your earnings depend only upon the choices you make and a series of 
random draws.  Your possible earnings are in dollar increments. 
 
Your total earnings for the experiment today are the summation of your earnings from 
Experiments 1, 2, and the $5.00 show-up fee. 
 




Before each experiment, I will read the instructions aloud.  After reading the instructions, 






 In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different 
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).   
 There will be 6 Sellers of product A, 6 Sellers of product B, and 6 Buyers (C) of 
products A and B in the room today. 
 The determination of whether you are an A or B product Seller or a product Buyer 
(C) is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment. 
 You will remain an A or B product Seller or a product Buyer (C) throughout the 
experimental session today.   
 Your payoffs in the experiment today are determined by:  
1) The price chosen by Seller A for product A, and 
2) The price chosen by Seller B for product B,    
 The experimental session consist of 20 trading rounds.   
 For each trading round, you will be randomly matched with a different set of 
trading partners/rivals.  
 There are no wrong or right decisions, only decisions you feel are in your best 
interest.  
 
Stages of Each Trading Period  
Each trading period consists of two stages.  These stages (i.e. steps) are the same for 
every trading period. 
 
Stage 1: Pricing Decisions  
 Seller A chooses a price for product A.   
→ The price of product A must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one 
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).  
→ Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price while making pricing decisions.  
 Seller B chooses a price for product B.   
→ The price of product B must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one 
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25). 
→ Seller B does not observe Seller A’s price while making pricing decisions.  
 
 Please refer to Table 1.  When making your pricing decisions, please note that:  
1) Seller A’s prices are located down the left hand side of the table. 
2) Seller B’s prices are located across the top of the table. 
3) Table 1 includes only some of the possible prices and payoffs and thus 
serves as a rough guideline for making pricing decisions.  Remember, 
you are free to choose any price between 0 and 1.99 tokens.    
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Stage 2: Payoffs Received by Seller A, Seller B and Buyer C 
 Please again refer to Table 1. 
 
 The payoffs, Sellers A and B as well as,  Buyer C receive for each trading period 
is determined by the trade prices of products A and B. 
   
 Notice in Table 1 that for any given price combination, within each cell, the 
amount of tokens Seller A receives is the top left number, the amount of tokens 
Seller B receives is the top  right number and the tokens Buyer C would earn is 
the bottom middle number.  
  
Example Trading Rounds 
 
1) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.06 tokens and Seller B chooses a 
price of 1.60 tokens.  Using Table 1, locate product A’s row price on the 
left side of the table.  Then, move across to the column that corresponds to 
product B’s price.  As you can see, Seller A receives a payoff of 71.16 
tokens, Seller B receives a payoff of 106.98 tokens and Buyer C would 
earn a payoff of 44.93 tokens. 
 
2) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.86 tokens and Seller B chooses a 
price of 0.80 tokens.  Using Table 1, locate product A’s row on the left 
side of the table.  Then, move across to the column that corresponds to 
product B’s price.  As you can see, Seller A receives a payoff of 124.12 
tokens, Seller B receives a payoff of 53.81 tokens and Buyer C would earn 
a payoff of 45.03 tokens. 
 
3) However, suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.37 tokens and Seller B 
chooses a price of 1.04 tokens.  Notice that neither of these prices appears 
on Table 1.  However, a close approximation would be locating the cell at 
the row/column intersection for A’s price of 1.33 tokens and B’s price of 





Are there any questions about how you can use Table 1 to determine your 
earnings given the price choices of Sellers A and B?  
 
169 
Computer Interaction  
 
Stage 1: Price Decisions  
 





 Price choices of Seller A and Seller B 
1) Sellers A and B enter their price in the box located in the middle of the 
computer screen.  Note: the computer will not accept a price less than 0 or 
a price greater than 1.99. 
 
2) Once Sellers are confident with their pricing decisions, they must submit 
their choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the lower right hand corner 
of the computer screen.  
 
 While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer will be presented 
with a blank waiting screen.  However, once both Sellers have input their pricing 
decisions, Buyer C will ‘click’ the red OK button, and the experiment will continue 






Stage 2: Trading Round Summary 
  
 All participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) will view the 





 The trading round’s summary consists of the prices chosen by both Sellers (A and 
B) and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller A, Seller B, and Buyer 
C).  Note: You will not see the summary of results for other randomly matched 
participants. 
 
 Your payoffs are denoted as “Your Profit” on the summary screen. 
 
 In addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of your payoffs are displayed 
at the bottom of the screen. 
 
 The summary will appear on each participant’s screen for 30 seconds. 
 
 After 30 seconds, you will automatically move on to the next trading round.  
 
 












We will start with 3 practice trading rounds.  These practice rounds will not be applied 




Practice rounds are denoted as -2, -1 and 0.  Once 
everyone has finished the practice rounds, you will 





If you have any questions at any time, please notify the 






There is to be no communication between participants or looking on other’s 
computer screens.  If anyone is caught doing so, the session will end, participants 



















Treatment 2 Instructions  
**Instructions for Market Experiment (Treatment 2)** 
 
Thank you for coming!!! 
 




Today, you will be participating in a series of experiments regarding i) your decision 
making in a market setting, ii) the decisions you make in risky situations, and iii) your 
level of assertive behavior in various scenarios.   
 
In the first experiment, you will either be making price decisions as sellers that impact all 
participants earnings, or you be will be subject to the pricing decisions of sellers, hence 
the buyer.   
 
In the second experiment you will be making independent choices where the outcome of 




You have been paid a $5.00 showing-up fee.  This money is yours regardless of whether 
you complete the experiment today.  
 
Experiment 1: You earn tokens based upon the decisions you make and those made by 
others.  At the end of the experiment today, the number of tokens you earn will be 
converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate.   
 
Experiment 2: Your earnings depend only upon the choices you make and a series of 
random draws.  Your possible earnings are in dollar increments. 
 
Your total earnings for the experiment today are the summation of your earnings from 
Experiments 1, 2, and the $5.00 show-up fee. 
 







Before each experiment, I will read the instructions aloud.  After reading the instructions, 





 In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different 
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).   
 There will be 6 Sellers of product A, 6 Sellers of product B and 6 Buyers (C) of 
both products A and B in the room today. 
 The determination of whether you are an A or B product Seller or a Buyer (C) is 
randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment. 
 You will remain an A or B Seller or Buyer (C) throughout the entire experiment.   
 Your payoffs in the market experiment are determined by:  
1) The price chosen by Seller A for product A, 
2) The price chosen by Seller B for product B.    
 The experimental session consist of 20 trading rounds.   
 For each trading round, you will be randomly matched with a different set of 
trading partners/rivals.  
 There are not wrong or right decisions, only decisions you feel are in your best 
interest.   
 
Stages of Each Trading Period  
 
Each trading round consists of two stages.  These stages are the same for every trading 
round. 
 
Stage 1: Pricing Decisions  
 
 Seller A chooses a price for product A.   
→ The price of product A must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one 
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).  
→ Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price decision while making their 
own pricing decision. 
  
 Seller B chooses a price for product B. 
→ The price of product B must be between 0 and 1.99 tokens, in one 
hundredth increments (i.e. 1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).  
→ Seller B does not observe Seller B’s price decision while making their 
own pricing decision.  
 
 Please refer to Table 3.  When making your pricing decisions, please note that:  
1) Seller A’s prices are located down the left hand side of the table. 
2) Seller B’s prices are located across the top of the table.  
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3) Table 3 includes only some of the possible prices and payoffs and thus 
serves only as a rough guideline for making pricing decisions.  
Remember, you are free to choose any price between 0 and 1.99 
tokens in one hundredth increments. 
 
 Stage 2: Earnings (Payoffs) Received by Seller A, Seller B and Buyer C 
 
 Please again refer to Table 3. 
 
 The payoffs that Sellers A and B, as well as, Buyer C receive for each trading 
round is determined by the trade prices chosen by the Sellers for their respective 
products. 
 
 Notice that in Table 3, for any given price combination, within each cell the 
amount of tokens Seller A would earn is the top left number, the amount of 
tokens Seller B would earn is the top right number and the tokens Buyer C would 
earn is the bottom number.  
 
Example Trading Rounds 
 
1) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.06 tokens and Seller B chooses a 
price of 1.60 tokens.  Using Table 3, locate A’s row price on the left side 
of the table.  Then, move across to the column that corresponds to B’s 
price.  As you can see, Seller A would earn a payoff of 71.16 tokens, 
Seller B would earn a payoff of 106.98 tokens and Buyer C would earn a 
payoff of 128.93 tokens. 
 
2) Now suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.86 tokens and Seller B chooses 
a price of 0.80 tokens.  Using Table 3, locate A’s row price on the left side 
of the table.  Then, move across to the column that corresponds to B’s 
price.  As you can see, Seller A would instead earn a payoff of 124.12 
tokens, Seller B would instead earn a payoff of 53.81 tokens and Buyer C 
would instead earn a payoff of 129.03 tokens. 
 
3) However, suppose Seller A would like to choose a price of 1.37 tokens 
and Seller B a price of 1.04 tokens.  Notice that neither of these prices 
appears on Table 3.  However, a close approximation of earnings can be 
located in the payoff cell at the row/column intersection of A’s price of 
1.33 and B’s price of 1.06.    
 
Are there any questions about how you can use Table 3 to determine your 





Stage 1: Pricing Decisions  
 Each Seller will view the following screen on their computer when making pricing 
decisions. 
 
 Price choices of Seller A and Seller B 
1) Sellers A and B enter their price in the box located in the middle of the 
computer screen.  Note: the computer will not accept a price less than 0 or a 
price greater than 1.99. 
 
2) Once Sellers are confident with their pricing decisions, they must submit their 
choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the lower right hand corner of the 
computer screen.  
 
 
While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer will be presented with a blank 
waiting screen.  However, once both Sellers have input their pricing decisions, Buyer C will 







Stage 2: Trading Round Summary  
 
 All participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) will view the following 




 The trading round’s summary consists of the prices chosen by both Sellers (A and B) 
and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller A, Seller B, and Buyer C).  
Note: You will not see the summary of results for other randomly matched 
participants. 
 
 Your payoffs are denoted as “Your Profit” on the summary screen. 
 
 In addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of your payoffs are displayed at 
the bottom of the screen. 
 
 The summary will appear on each participant’s screen for 30 seconds. 
 














We will start with 3 practice trading rounds.  These practice rounds will not be applied 




Practice rounds are denoted as -2, -1 and 0.  Once 
everyone has finished the practice rounds, you will 





If you have any questions at any time, please notify the 






There is to be no communication between participants or looking on other’s 
computer screens.  If anyone is caught doing so, the session will end, participants 
























Treatment 3 Instructions  
** Instructions for Market Experiment (Treatment 5)** 
 
 
Thank you for coming!!! 
 




Today, you will be participating in a series of experiments regarding i) your decision 
making in a market setting, ii) the decisions you make in risky situations, and iii) your 
level of assertive behavior in various scenarios.   
 
In the first experiment, you will either be making price decisions as sellers that impact all 
participants earnings, or you be will be subject to the pricing decisions of sellers, hence 
the buyer.   
 
In the second experiment you will be making independent choices where the outcome of 




You have been paid a $5.00 showing-up fee.  This money is yours regardless of whether 
you complete the experiment today.  
 
Experiment 1: You earn tokens based upon the decisions you make and those made by 
others.  At the end of the experiment today, the number of tokens you earn will be 
converted to dollars at an undisclosed conversion rate.   
 
Experiment 2: Your earnings depend only upon the choices you make and a series of 
random draws.  Your possible earnings are in dollar increments. 
 
Your total earnings for the experiment today are the summation of your earnings from 
Experiments 1, 2, and the $5.00 show-up fee. 
 




Before each experiment, I will read the instructions aloud.  After reading the instructions, 
I will take time to answer individual questions  
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Market Experiment  
 
 In this experiment, there are two Sellers (A and B) each supplying a different 
fictitious input product to a Buyer (C).   
 There will be 6 Sellers of product A, 6 Sellers of product B and 6 Buyers (C) of 
both products A and B in the room today. 
 The determination of whether you are an A or B product Seller or a Buyer (C) is 
randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment. 
 You will remain an A or B Seller or Buyer (C) throughout the entire experiment.   
 Your payoffs in the market experiment are determined by:  
1) The price chosen by Seller A for product A, 
2) The price chosen by Seller B for product B.    
 The experimental session consist of 20 trading rounds.   
 For each trading round, you will be randomly matched with a different set of 
trading partners/rivals.  
 There are no wrong or right decisions, only decisions you feel are in your best 
interest. 
 
Stages of Each Trading Period  
Each trading period consists of two stages.  These stages (i.e. steps) are the same for 
every trading round. 
 
Stage 1: Pricing Decisions  
 
 Seller A chooses a price for product A.   
→ The price of product A must be between 0 and 2.51 tokens, in one 
hundredth increments (1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).  
→ Seller A does not observe Seller B’s price while making  their own pricing 
decisions.  
 
 Seller B chooses a price for product B.   
→ The price of product B must be between 0 and 2.51 tokens, in one 
hundredth increments (1.92, 0.82, and 1.25).  
→ Seller B does not observe Seller A’s price while making their own pricing 
decisions.  
 
 Please refer to Table 5.  When making your pricing decisions, please note that:  
1) Seller A’s prices are located down the left hand side of the table. 
2) Seller B’s prices are located across the top of the table.  
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3) Table 5 includes only some of the possible prices and payoffs and thus 
serves as a rough guideline for making pricing decisions.  Remember, 
you are free to choose any price between 0 and 2.51 tokens.    
 
Stage 2: Earnings (Payoffs) Received by Seller A, Seller B and Buyer C 
 Please again refer to Table 5.   
 
 The payoffs that Sellers A and B, as well as, Buyer C receive for each trading 
round is determined by the trade prices chosen by the Sellers for their respective 
products. 
    
 Notice that in Table 5, for any given price combination, within each cell the 
amount of tokens Seller A would earn is the top left number, the amount of 
tokens Seller B would earn is the top right number and the tokens Buyer C would 
earn is the bottom  number.  
  
Example Trading Rounds 
 
1) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.40 tokens and Seller B chooses a 
price of 1.66 tokens.  Using Table 5, locate product A’s row price on the 
left side of the table.  Then, move across to the column that corresponds to 
product B’s price.  As you can see, Seller A would earn a payoff of 136.75 
tokens, Seller B would earn  a payoff of 160.49 tokens and Buyer C would 
earn a payoff of 94.29 tokens. 
 
2) Suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.94 tokens and Seller B chooses a 
price of 1.40  tokens.  Using Table 5, locate product A’s row on the left 
side of the table.  Then, move across to the column that corresponds to 
product B’s price.  As you can see, Seller A would earn a payoff of 161.24 
tokens, Seller B would earn a payoff of 116.04 tokens and Buyer C 
receives a payoff of 68.92 tokens. 
 
3) However, suppose Seller A chooses a price of 1.30 tokens and Seller B 
chooses a price of 1.37 tokens.  Neither of these prices appears on Table 5.  
However, a close approximation would be locating the cell at the 
row/column intersection of A’s price of 1.25 and  B’s price of 1.40.    
 
Are there any questions about how you can use Table 5 to determine your 
earnings given the price choices of Sellers A and B?  
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Computer Interaction  
Stage 1: Price Decisions  
 Each Seller will view the following screen on their computer when making 
pricing decisions 
 
 Price choices of Seller A and Seller B 
1) Sellers A and B enter their price in the box located in the middle of the 
computer screen.  Note: the computer will not accept a price less than 0 or 
a price greater than 2.51. 
2) Once Sellers are confident with their pricing decisions, they must submit 
their choice by ‘clicking’ the red OK button on the lower right hand corner 
of the computer screen.  
While the Sellers are making their pricing decisions, the Buyer will be presented 
with a blank waiting screen.  However, once both Sellers have input their pricing 
decisions, Buyer C will ‘click’ the red OK button, and the experiment will continue 
to stage 2.  
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Stage 2: Trading Round Summary  
 
 All participants in the experiment (Buyer and Sellers alike) will view the 





 The trading round’s summary consists of the prices chosen by both Sellers (A and 
B) and the respective payoffs for each participant (Seller A, Seller B, and Buyer 
C).  Note: You will not see the summary of results for other randomly matched 
participants. 
 Your payoffs are denoted as “Your Profit” on the summary screen. 
 In addition to the current round’s payoff, a history of your payoffs are displayed 
at the bottom of the screen. 
 The summary will appear on each participant’s screen for 30 seconds. 
 After 30 seconds, you will automatically move on to the next trading round.  
 
 











We will start with 3 practice trading rounds.  These practice rounds will not be applied 






Practice rounds are denoted as -2, -1 and 0.  Once 
everyone has finished the practice rounds, you will 








If you have any questions at any time, please notify the 









There is to be no communication between participants or looking on other’s 
computer screens.  If anyone is caught doing so, the session will end, participants 
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